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I. NATURE AND SOURCES OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. General Principles
TJDUNITIVE" or "exemplary" damages' are money damages
I awarded to a plaintiff in a private civil action, in addition to
and apart from compensatory damages, assessed against a defend-
ant guilty of flagrantly violating the plaintiff's rights.2 The pur-
poses of such damages are usually said to be (1) to punish the
defendant for outrageous misconduct and (2) to deter the defend-
ant and others from similarly misbehaving in the future.A
A jury (or judge, if there is no jury) may, in its discretion,
render such an award in cases in which the defendant is found to
have injured the plaintiff intentionally or "maliciously," or in which
the defendant's conduct reflected a "conscious," "reckless," "wilful,"
"wanton" or "oppressive" disregard of the rights or interests of the
plaintiff. Punitive damages may be assessed against an employer vi-
cariously for the misconduct of its employees, although some states
restrict such awards to instances where a managing officer of the
enterprise ordered, participated in or consented to the miscon-
duct.4 The harm to the plaintiff may be physical, emotional, finan-
1. The terms "punitive" and "exemplary" damages today generally are used
interchangeably. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990); see also RICHARD L.
BLATT ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 1.3 A (1991) (referring to "punitory," "penal," "additional," "aggravated," "ple-
nary," "imaginary" and "smart money" as terms used to describe punitive dam-
ages); Samuel Freifield, The Rationale of Punitive Damages, 1 OHIO ST. L.J. 5, 5
(1935). In civil law nations, "extra" damages serving similar functions are referred
to as "moral" damages, "satisfaction" or "private fines." See Hans Stoll, Penal Pur-
poses in the Law of Tort, 18 AM.J. COMP. L. 3, 13-19 (1970) (analyzing significance of
punitive damages).
2. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. b (1977) (stating
that punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, either be-
cause of defendant's evil motive or reckless indifference to rights of others).
3. "Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal dam-
ages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct." Id.
§ 908(1). Comment a to section 908 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts further
provides: "The purposes of awarding punitive damages... are to punish the per-
son doing the wrongful act and to discourage him and others from similar conduct
in the future." For a further general discussion of the purposes of punitive dam-
age awards, see infra notes 49-77 and accompanying text.
4. The Restatement (Second) of Torts takes the narrower approach, assessing pu-
nitive damages against an employer only in cases where the employer authorized
or ratified the act, was reckless in employing or retaining the agent, or the agent
was in a managerial capacity and acting in the scope of employment. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 909. See generally 1-2 JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAw AND PRACTICE § 24 (1994) (discussing different state ap-
proaches to vicarious liability in punitive damages actions); David G. Owen, Puni-
tive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1257, 1299-1308 (1976)
[hereinafter Owen, Punitive Damages] (same-products liability litigation).
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cial or involve property damage or loss. 5 The amount of the award
is determined by the jury6 upon consideration of the seriousness of
the wrong, the seriousness of the plaintiff's injury and the extent of
the defendant's wealth.7
Thus, punitive damages are, in a real sense "quasi-criminal,"
standing half-way between the civil and the criminal law. They are
"awarded" as "damages" to a plaintiff against a defendant in a pri-
vate lawsuit; yet the purpose of such assessments in most jurisdic-
tions is explicitly held to be noncompensatory and in the nature of
a penal fine. Because the gravamen of such damages is considered
civil, the procedural safeguards of the criminal law (such as the be-
yond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof and prohibitions against
double jeopardy, excessive fines and compulsory self-incrimination)
generally are held not to apply. This strange mixture of criminal
and civil law objectives and effects-creating a form of penal rem-
edy inhabiting (some would say "invading") the civil-law domain-
5. Most general assertions on punitive damages doctrine have exceptions in
some states. In Minnesota, for example, such damages are not available for prop-
erty damage alone, at least not in products liability cases. See Independent Sch.
Dist. No. 622 v. Keene Corp., 511 N.W.2d 728 (Minn, 1994) (finding that school
district suffered only property damage). As another example, Kansas, as many
states, prohibits such awards in wrongful death-but not in survival-actions.
Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985, 998-919 (Kan. 1993) (reviewing national status of
rule). Of whatever type, the damages must have been caused in fact by the defend-
ant's reprehensible behavior. E.g. Vaughn v. North Am. Sys., Inc., 869 S.W.2d 757
(Mo. 1994) (holding that plaintiff-consumer failed to establish minimum "but for"
causation required to support punitive damages claim). Idaho permits recovery
for punitive damages except in claims against government entities or in claims
where punitive damages are statutorily prohibited. BLATT ET AL., supra note 1,
§ 8.22 (discussing scope of Idaho's punitive damage doctrine); see, e.g., IDAHO
CODE §§ 5-327, 6-712, 6-918 (1990) (prohibiting punitive damages against estate of
wrongdoer for libel or slander, unless retraction is not made and actual malice is
shown, and against government entities, respectively). Louisiana allows punitive
damages only when specifically authorized by statute. BLATr ET AL., supra note 1,
§ 8.28; see, e.g., LA. CrV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.3-.4 (West 1994) (authorizing punitive
damages in survival actions involving transportation of hazardous or toxic sub-
stances and for injuries caused by intoxicated drivers acting with wanton or reck-
less disregard of safety of others). For state-by-state review of the availability of
punitive damage awards, see BLATr ET AL., supra note 1, § 8.11-.60 (discussing puni-
tive damages rules in various states).
6. Courts quite frequently order the remittitur of punitive damage verdicts
deemed excessive, but the additur of such awards may improperly invade the prov-
ince of thejury. See Bozeman v. Busby, 639 So. 2d 501 (Ala. 1994) (holding statute
authorizing trial court to override jury verdict awarding punitive damages violated
Alabama's constitution).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2). The Restatement provides in
part: "In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider the
character of the defendant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to plaintiff that
the defendant has caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant."
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assures that controversy and debate follow such assessments wher-
ever they may roam, as surely as summer follows spring.
The punitive damages doctrine is mixed as well in terms of its
institutional derivation, which is partly judicial and partly legisla-
tive. While the doctrine generally is considered to be fundamen-
tally a creature of the common law, both its historical roots and
many current sources are found in statutory, and occasionally con-
stitutional, provisions.8 Many western states,9 whose legal systems
are codified to a large extent, have express legislative provisions
which generally authorize punitive damages in appropriate cases in-
volving aggravated misconduct.10 In addition, a large miscellany of
statutes, both federal and state, provide expressly for punitive or
multiple damages in a great variety of particular situations.1" For
8. Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 4, at 1262-64 (tracing origins of puni-
tive damages). See generally David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages
Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1982) [herein-
after Owen, Problems] (noting historical sources of punitive damage awards). For a
discussion of the history of punitive damages, see infra notes 17-32 and accompany-
ing text.
9. Examples of western states with express legislation authorizing punitive
damages in cases involving aggravated misconduct are California, Nevada, Mon-
tana, Oklahoma, North Dakota and South Dakota. See generally BLATr ET AL., supra
note 1, §§ 8.15, 8.38, 8.36, 8.46, 8.44, 8.51.
10. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CODE § 3294 (West 1970) (allowing punitive damages in
non-contract claims for sake of example and to punish defendant guilty of oppres-
sion, fraud or malice); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1993) (allowing punitive
damages when defendant guilty of actual fraud or actual malice); NEv. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 42.005 (Michie 1993) (listing situations where punitive damages are
proper); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-07 (1976) (authorizing punitive damages for
breach of obligation in non-contract claims where party engaged in oppression,
fraud or malice); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1987) (allowing punitive dam-
ages where there is no direct evidence of fraud, malice or gross negligence but
there exists such wanton disregard of rights that malice can be inferred); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 21-3-2 (1987) (authorizing punitive damages when defend-
ant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, or in cases of wrongful injury to ani-
mals, committed intentionally or by willful conduct).
11. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1993) (treble damages available under anti-
trust law); id. § 1681 (n) (actual and punitive damages available for wilful violations
of consumer credit reporting law); 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b) (1993) (statutory and puni-
tive damages available for illegal wire tapping); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3340 (West 1970)
(punitive damages available for willful or grossly negligent wrongful injury to
animal); IowA CODE § 639.14 (1950) (exemplary damages available for attachment
when there is evidence of actual malice); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140 (Law. Co-op.
1985) (treble damages available for knowing practice of unfair or deceptive trade
practices); TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 5 (West 1967) (punitive damages
available for wrongful death of workman); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-412 (Supp.
1973) (punitive damages available for injuries from knowingly receiving stolen
property); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (Michie 1992) (punitive damages available for
knowing, unauthorized use of another's identity). In addition to such express stat-
utory provisions, the courts have inferred punitive damages into a number of fed-
eral statutes. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (punitive damages available for
deprivations of civil rights under color of state law).
366 [Vol. 39: p. 363
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example, a Connecticut statute provides for punitive damages in
appropriate products liability cases, limiting the amount of such
damages to double the amount of the compensatory award.1 2 By
contrast, many states, either statutorily or constitutionally, prohibit
punitive damages in a vast array of specific contexts, from aliena-
tion of affection and defamation 13 to commercial transactions
under the Uniform Commercial Code.14 More broadly, four states
prohibit all awards of punitive damages unless specifically author-
ized by statute.1 5 The law and commentary on punitive damages is
diverse, vast and rapidly expanding.1 6
12. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-240b (1991).
13. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 740, Act 5 § 3 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (forbidding
punitive damages in actions for loss of alienation of affection); Wheeler v. Green,
593 P.2d 777, 789 (Or. 1979) (stating that Article I § 8 of Oregon Constitution
prohibits award of punitive damages in defamation cases unless another constitu-
tional provision explicitly requires application).
14. See, e.g., N.Y. U.C.C. LAw § 1-106 (McKinney 1993) ("[P]enal damages
may [not] be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of
law."); U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1977) (same); accord Computerized Radiological Serv.,
Inc. v. Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495, 1509 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (recognizing that
U.C.C. §§ 1-106, 2-714 and 2-715 prohibit punitive damages in breach of warranty
actions).
• 15. E.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1986 & Supp. 1993); see Panas v.
Harakis, 529 A.2d 976, 986 (N.H. 1987) (stating general rule that punitive dam-
ages are forbidden in New Hampshire); see also infra note 30.
16. As witnessed by this Symposium. There are three helpful general treatises
on punitive damages: GERALD W. BOSTON, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN TORT LAw (1993);
GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 4 and LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN,
PUNrrITVE DAMAGES (2d ed. 1989). For a state-by-state survey, see BLATr ET AL., supra
note 1. The law review literature is rich and continues to grow apace. Recent
noteworthy articles include: Gerald W. Boston, Environmental Torts and Punitive
Damages, 14J. PROD. Ltd. 1, 139 (1992); George C. Christie, Current Trends in the
American Law of Punitive Damages, 20 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 349 (1991); Stephen Dan-
iels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1
(1990) (describing punitive damages debate and empirical evidence undermining
tort reformers' characterization of punitive damages); Marc Galanter & David
Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1393,
1418 (1993) (discussing current cases challenging punitive damages); Thomas C.
Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L.
REv. 3, 34 (1990) (discussing recent statutory reforms regarding punitive dam-
ages); Bailey Kuklin, Punishment: The Civil Perspective of Punitive Damages, 37 CLEV.
ST. L. REv. 1 (1989) (thoroughly examining philosophical bases of punitive dam-
ages functions); Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability:
Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IowA L. REv. 1 (1989); William H. Volz
& Michael C. Fayz, Punitive Damages and the Due Process Clause: The Search for Consti-
tutional Standards, 69 U. DET. L. REV. 459 (1992). Two important earlier symposia
were Symposium: Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REv. 687 (1989) and Symposium:
Punitive Damages, 56 So. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1982) (based on article by Dorsey D. Ellis,
Jr.).
My own earlier work on punitive damages includes: David G. Owen, Civil Pun-
ishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 103 (1982) [hereinafter Owen, Civil
Punishment]; David G. Owen, Crashworthiness Litigation and Punitive Damages, 4 J.
PROD. LLu. 221 (1982); David G. Owen, Foreword: The Use and Control of Punitive
1994]
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B. History
Punitive damages have a deep history in the law. 17 Their early
ancestor was the doctrine of multiple damages, a form of punitive
damages measured according to a predetermined scale. Such dam-
ages were provided for in Babylonian law nearly 4000 years ago in
the Code of Hammurabi, the earliest known legal code.1 8 These
damages were also recognized in the Hittite Laws of about 1400
B.C.,19 the Hebrew Covenant Code of Mosaic law dating back to
about 1200 B.C.20 and the Hindu Code of Manu of about 200 B.C.
2 1
The very basis of early Roman civil law, beginning with the Twelve
Tables of 450 B.C., was punitive in nature, and several provisions in
classical Roman law prescribed double, treble and quadruple
damages. 22
Perhaps the first English provision for multiple damages was
enacted by Parliament in 1275: "Trespassers against religious per-
sons shall yield double damages."23 Including this first statute, Par-
liament enacted at least 65 separate provisions for double, treble
and quadruple damages between 1275 and 1753.24
"Exemplary" damages were first explicitly authorized in Eng-
Damages, 11 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV. 309 (1985) [hereinafter Owen, Foreword];
Owen, Problems, supra note 8; Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 4; David G. Owen,
The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 705 (1989) [hereinafter
Owen, Moral Foundations].
17. For the history of punitive damages, see Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and
Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 So. CAL. L. REv. 1, 12-20 (1982) (tracing
English history of such awards); Daniels & Martin, supra note 16, at 6-7 (discussing
early punitive damage awards in England and America); Owen, Punitive Damages,
supra note 4, at 1262-64 (tracing deep roots of punitive damages in ancient law);
Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 Am. U. L. REV. 1269, 1284-97 (1993) (trac-
ing origins of punitive damages).
18. G. DIVER &J. MILES, THE BABYLONIAN LAws 500-01 (1952).
19. MELVIN M. BELLI, MODERN DAMAGES 75 (1959) (emphasizing that multiple
damages have been recognized for centuries).
20. See Exodus 22:1 (thief who slaughters or sells ox or sheep shall restore five
oxen or four sheep for one stolen; if animal is found alive in thief's possession, he
shall restore two animals for each one stolen).
21. BELLI, supra note 19, at 84; see also Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 4, at
1262 n.17.
22. See W.W. BUCKLAND, A TExT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAw 581-84 (3d rev. Stein
ed. 1966); W.W. BUCKLAND & A. McNAIR, ROMAN LAw AND COMMON LAw 344-45
(2d rev. Lawson ed. 1965).
23. Synopsis of Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw., ch. 1. (Eng.), in 24 GREAT
BRITAIN STATUTES AT LARGE 138 (Pickering Index 1761).
24. Id. at 138-41. See generally 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
THE ENGLISH LAW 522 (2d ed. 1899) (referring to these multiple damage provi-
sions as "penal and exemplary damages").
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land in Huckle v. Money,25 decided in 1763. The doctrine was
promptly transported to America, where such an award was allowed
twenty-one years later in Genay v. Norris,2 6 a case involving a plaintiff
who became ill after drinking a glass of wine laced with Spanish Fly
added by the defendant as a practical joke.27 By the mid-nine-
teenth century, punitive damages had become an established fix-
ture in American law. In Day v. Woodworth,28 the Supreme Court
asserted, without' citation (and with some exaggeration), that the
doctrine was supported by "repeated judicial decisions for more
than a century."2 9 By the early part of this century, all but five states
provided generally for such awards upbn' appropriate proof.3 0 Yet,
even in these few renegade states, with the possible exception of
25. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763). In a false imprisonment and trespass action
by a journeyman printer against agents of the King, the judge instructed the jury
that they were not bound to certain damages, and the jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff in the amount of £300. Id. The King's Counsel moved for the verdict
to be set aside and for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was excessive
because the printer was confined only for a few hours and was treated well. Id.
The court found the damages not to be excessive and stressed its reluctance to
meddle with damage awards, characterizing the damages awarded as "exemplary
damages." Id. at 769; accord Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763) (al-
lowing such damages in a similar ease in amount of £1000). From 'the start, Eng-
lish courts have employed the remedy to punish and deter the misuse of wealth
and power. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 17, at 1289 nn.100-01.
26. 1 S.C. 3, 1 Bay 6 (1784) (awarding "vindictive damages" to plaintiff despite
defense of drunken frolic).
27. Id. Even though defendant claimed it was a joke, it seriously injured the
plaintiff. Id.; see Rustad & Koenig, supra note 17, at 1290 (discussing early Ameri-
can cases awarding punitive damages).
28. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851). The Court, discussing the
damages available to a plaintiff in a trespass action, stated that:
It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in action of tres-
pass and all actions on the case for torts, ajury may inflict what are called
exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in
view the enormity of his offence rather than the measure of compensa-
tion to the plaintiff.
Id. The Court further stated that when an injury was wanton or malicious, gross
and outrageous, the jury may add to the plaintiff's compensation. Id.
29. Day, 54 U.S. at 371. This would indicate the existence of punitive dam-
ages awards twelve years prior to Huckle, which appears erroneous. See Owen, Puni-
tive Damages, supra note 4, at 1263 n.19.
30. CHARLEs T. MCCORMICK, LAw OF DAMAGES 278-79 (1935) (listing Louisi-
ana, Massachusetts, Nebraska and Washington as only states without such general
doctrine). New Hampshire perhaps also should have been included as a state that
generally prohibits such awards. In Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and
Washington punitive damages are allowable only when specifically authorized by
statute. Billiot v. BP Oil Co., 617 So. 2d 28 (La. Ct. App. 1993); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 106, § 1-106 (West 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507.16 (1986) (Supp.
1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 64.34.100 (1994). Punitive damages are constitutionally
prohibited in Nebraska. Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d
566, 574 -(Neb. 1989) (holding such damages contravene constitutional limitation
on penalties).
1994] 369
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Nebraska, 31 punitive damages are legislatively authorized for a vari-
ety of specific situations.32
C. Controversial Nature of Punitive Damages
1. In General
Controversy has followed punitive damages throughout its his-
tory in this nation. "Punitive damages like class actions have been
highly praised and roundly denounced depending on who is paying
the piper."3 3 Two leading treatise writers in the nineteenth cen-
tury, Sedgwick and Greenleaf, engaged in a long-standing scholarly
debate over whether such damages should be allowed at all.34 The
depth of the early philosophical disagreement in this nation is col-
orfully portrayed by the remarks of different state supreme court
justices. In a nineteenth century New Hampshire case, the court
remarked: "The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an
unsightly and unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of
the body of law."35 In contrast, consider the observations of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court shortly after the turn of the century:
The law giving exemplary damages is an outgrowth of the
English love of liberty regulated by law. It tends to elevate
the jury as a responsible instrument of government, dis-
31. See Distinctive Printing, 443 N.W.2d at 574 (punitive damages prohibited by
state constitution).
32. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2315.3-.4 (West 1994) (punitive damages
available for reckless disregard of safety in storage, handling or transportation of
hazardous waste; also for wanton or reckless drunk driving); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 93, § 63 (West 1993) (punitive damages available for failure to comply with
consumer reporting agency statute); id. at ch. 111, § 199 (punitive damages avail-
able for failure to correct dangerous lead levels upon premises); id. at ch. 131,
§ 5C (punitive damages available for interference with lawful taking of fish or wild-
life); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080 (West 1994) (punitive damages available
for malicious harassment).
33. In re Paris Air Crash, 427 F. Supp. 701, 705 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (discussing
controversy concerning punitive damages in wrongful death actions and holding
California ban on punitive damages in wrongful death actions unconstitutional),
rev'd, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir.) (holding that punitive damage ban did not violate
federal constitution), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980).
34. Compare 1 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURES OF DAMAGES
§ 355 (9th ed. 1912) with 2 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
8253 (16th ed. 1899). Greenleaf adamantly opposed punitive damages, believing
that they were not part of the American tradition and had no doctrinal basis.
Sedgwick, on the other hand, was a staunch proponent of exemplary damages and
believed they were an effective way of setting an example for the community. See
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 17, at 1298-1302 (summarizing Greenleaf-Sedgwick
debate).
35. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872) (criticizing and setting aside jury's
punitive damages award in assault and battery action).
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courages private reprisals, restrains the strong, influential
and unscrupulous, vindicates the right of the weak, and
encourages recourse to, and confidence in, the courts of
law by those wronged or oppressed by acts or practices not
cognizable in, or not sufficiently punished, by the criminal
law.36
Courts critical of this form of damages often recite that punitive
damages are not favored by the law.3 7 The frequency of such ex-
hortations reveals the widespread objections to such awards, both
generally and as applied in individual cases. Such generalized as-
sertions of disapprobation, however, carry little legal content but
reflect much more the personal ideology of the individual judge.
2. Tort Reform-Rhetoric and Reality
As the number and size of punitive damage verdicts and judg-
ments increased in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in products
liability litigation, such awards became a central, highly politicized
part of the broader "tort reform" movement.38 This movement
arose out of supposed "crises" in the areas of medical malpractice
and products liability-particularly in the availability and af-
fordability of liability insurance-first in the mid-1970s and again in
the mid-1980s. As has been true with tort reform in general, the
debate on punitive damages has also been highly charged. Claim-
ing that "runaway" punitive damage awards have become routine,
especially in products liability cases, businesses and insurance com-
panies have carried their message to the legislatures and the
courts.39 Many courts, along With close to thirty state legislatures,
have responded by adopting a variety of laws "reforming" punitive
damages in various ways, expanded upon below. 40
36. Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 17, 20 (Wis. 1914) (allowing punitive damages
in action for breach of promise to marry).
37. E.g., Lyons v. Jordan, 524 A.2d 1199, 1204 (D.C. 1987) (stating that such
damages are disfavored, but allowing them on facts of case).
38. See generally Rustad, supra note 16, at 24 (discussing how punitive damage
awards have increased in frequency and size); Daniels & Martin, supra note 16, at
10-14 (discussing politicization of tort reform movement).
39. Rustad, supra note 16, at 2 (recognizing concern about punitive damage
awards in products liability actions and setting forth empirical data in attempt to
correct mistaken beliefs which helped fuel tort reform movement).
40. See Galligan, supra note 16; at 34-35 (discussing recent state and federal
legislative tort reform); Rustad, supra note 16, at 6 n.22 (noting that many state
legislative reforms curb punitive damage awards); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 17,
at 1278-81 (setting forth Model State Punitive Damage Act based on tort reform
movement).
19941
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There is no doubt that the number of large, sometimes very
large, punitive damage verdicts in products liability cases has in-
creased. substantially in recent years. 4' Nevertheless, such jury
awards are still quite uncommon and, even when awarded, they are
frequently reduced or eliminated altogether by the-trial judge or on
appeal. The most thorough empirical study to date of punitive
damages in products liability cases was recently conducted by
Professors Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig.42 Their study
showed "that punitive damages are generally working appropri-
ately,"43 and they concluded as follows:
Punitive damages are rarely awarded and even more rarely
collected. When they are awarded, they are generally
richly deserved. In most cases, punitive damages were as-
sessed against corporations because they had prior knowl-
edge of a developing or known risk and failed to take
remedial safety steps. The popular perception of vast
wealth being awarded in the form of punitive damages to
greedy or extremely careless plaintiffs contrasts sharply
with the profile that emerges from' our study. The typical
plaintiff was permanently disabled or killed by a product
known by the manufacturer to be unnecessarily
hazardous.44
One of their "most striking finding[s]" was that they could only lo-
cate a total of 355 punitive damage verdicts in the thousands of
products liability actions over the quarter century of the survey. 45
41. See generally Daniels & Martin, stpra note 16, at 28-62 (setting forth data
on patterns of punitive damage awards by examining general damage awards and
rates for different categories of cases); Owen, Problems, supra note 8, at 1-6 (discuss-
ing increase in punitive damage awards).
42. See generally Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, The Quiet Revolution Revis-
ited: An Empirical Study of the Impact of State Tort Reform of Punitive Damages in Prod-
ucts Liability, 16 JusT.. Svs. J. 21 (1993) (conducting extensive empirical
examination of punitive damage awards in products liability cases); Rustad, supra
note 16, at 24 (concluding that data fails to support claim that punitive damages
have grown in frequency and size); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 17, at 1308 (exam-
ining empirical data).
43. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Punitive Damages in Products Liabil-
ity: An Empirical Study of the Last Quarter Century of Verdicts 14 (Nov. 14, 1991)
(transcript available at Suffolk University Law School).
44. Id. at 14-15.
45. Id. at 16. During this period, the CCH Products Liability Reporter re-
ported roughly 10,000 products liability judicial decisions, and many such deci-
sions are frequently never reported. Therefore, assuming conservatively that the
total number of products liability verdicts over the period was twice the number
reported in CCH, the 355 punitive damage verdicts represent roughly only 2% of
the total. However, it is important to note that the frequency and judicial approval
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Their study confirmed the small numbers of such awards reported
by other nationwide empirical investigators: "Landes and Posner
found two percent of the products cases resulting in punitive dam-
ages, while the Rand study found only 1/10th of one percent in
Cook County and even less in San Francisco."46
Thus, punitive damages-especially in products liability litiga-
tion-are very much on the table, so to speak. As this article goes
to press, the United States Supreme Court has just decided the
fourth punitive damage case considered in the last five years.47
Courts, legislatures and commentators continue to examine this
strange creature of the civil law in an effort to determine whether,
and if so how, it should be redefined, harnessed or perhaps rele-
gated altogether to the history books containing ancient peculiari-
ties of the law that guided societies in less civilized times.
II. FUNCTIONS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. General Principles
In order to evaluate the difficulties with punitive damages that
render it a controversial doctrine (considered in detail in Section
III),48 the functions that underlie and support the doctrine must
first be examined to determine whether the game,: as it were, is
worth the candle. Although most courts refer only to "punishment"
and "deterrence" as rationales for such damages, 49 this masks the
variety of specific functions that punitive damages actually serve.
The functions of punitive damages can be divided and subdivided
in any number of overlapping ways, but the following division
of such awards increased rather substantially over this protracted period, particu-
larly in the 1970s and early 1980s. See Owen, Problems, supra note 8. For most of
the period, in other words, the trend appears to have been considerably upward,
such that the percentage of products liability cases in which punitive damages are
awarded today may be somewhat higher than 2%. See generally Rustad, supra note
16, at 30 (presenting study utilizing the 355 punitive damage awards in products
liability cases); Rustad and Koenig, supra note 17, at 1309 (setting forth number of
punitive damages verdicts in products liability cases during 1965-90 found in pub-
lished and unpublished federal and state cases nationwide). In ,recent years, how-
ever, the. trend of punitive damage awards in non-asbestos products liability cases
appears to have turned downward. Koenig & Rustad, supra note 42, at 21.
46. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 43, at 7-8.
47. For a further discussion on recent Supreme Court developments, see infra
notes 129-50 and accompanying text.
48. For a further discussion of the difficulties and controversies surrounding
punitive damages, see infra notes 78-126 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 343 (1972) (Marshall, J., con-
curring) (discussing punitive damages and purposes of deterrence in general); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977).
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should prove useful for the particular points examined here: (1)
education, 50 (2) retribution,51 (3) deterrence,52 (4) compensa-
tion 53 and (5) law enforcement.54
B. Specific Functions
1. Education
Punitive damages serve a strong educative function for both
the individual offender and society in general, in two significant
respects. First, punitive damages certify the existence of a particular
legally protected right or interest belonging to the plaintiff, on the
one hand, and a correlative legal duty on the part of the defendant
to respect that interest, on the other. Second, punitive damages
proclaim the importance that the law attaches to the plaintiff's par-
ticular invaded right, and the corresponding condemnation that soci-
ety attaches to its flagrant invasion by the kind of conduct engaged
in by the defendant. 55
Much more than assessments of responsibility for actual dam-
ages, punitive damages assessments sensationalize the conse-
quences of improper behavior in a manner that serves to inform
and remind the defendant and society at large that a particular
right-duty legal value not only exists, but is given staunch protection
by the law. 56 Society's most important rules governing how people
50. For a discussion of education as a function of punitive damages, see infra
notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
51. For a discussion of retribution as a function of punitive damages, see infra
notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
52. For a discussion of deterrence as a function of punitive damages, see infra
notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
53. For a discussion of compensation as a function of punitive damages, see
infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
54. For a discussion of law enforcement as a function of punitive damages, see
infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. Much of the following discussion on the
functions of punitive damages is from Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 16 and
Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 4, at 1277-99. See generally, Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr.,
Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 3-12
(1982) (examining seven different purposes for punitive damage awards); Kuklin,
supra note 16 (thoroughly examining philosophical bases of functions).
55. For this reason, this goal may aptly be referred to as the condemnation
function. See, e.g., THE LAw COMMISSION (GREAT BRITAIN), AGGRAVATED, EXEM-
PLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES-A CONSULTATION PAPER 114, 123 (Consulta-
tion Paper No. 132, 1993) [hereinafter CONSULTATION PAPER] (discussing how
condemnation is legitimate goal of civil law which is served by awarding punitive
damages).
56. Professor Gerald Boston informs me that the American Medical Associa-
tion publicizes punitive damage verdicts against medical care products. See gener-
ally Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 4, at 1281 n.123 (discussing how
punishment serves as device which can educate offender on society's legal values).
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are to live together, and the boundaries of their respective spheres
of freedom to pursue their personal interests that sometimes con-
flict, are publicly declared and certified as fundamental by punitive
damage awards. This form of judicial punishment expresses the
community's disapproval of serious misconduct such as flagrant
breaches of rules governing how people are to treat one another.
Furthermore, it publicly reaffirms society's commitment to main-
taining its moral and legal standards.
2. Retribution
Perhaps the most fundamental, philosophic basis for punitive
damages is to provide retribution to the victim of an aggravated
wrong.57 It may initially seem strange in a modern legal system for
the law to be based on a kind of private revenge, but it is entirely
appropriate for the law to allow a person injured by the wanton
misconduct of another to vent his outrage by extracting from the
wrongdoer a judicial fine. 58 This form of retribution is appropriate
because it protects and promotes the two most fundamental values
that support the law-freedom and equality.59
Because punitive damages are designed to punish conduct that
is "quasi-criminal,"60 their justification based on a retribution the-
ory is facilitated by examining the doctrine in terms of a metaphor
based on theft. The wrongdoer (the "thief") deserves to be pun-
ished because he has "stolen" things of value, from both the individ-
ual and society, that need to be returned in order to prevent the
unjust impoverishment of the victim (and society) and the unjust
enrichment of the thief. The scales of justice, thrown out of bal-
ance by the offense, can only be restored by corresponding punish-
ment. In this respect, the offender's punishment serves as a form of
57. See generally Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 16; Owen, Punitive Dam-
ages, supra note 4, at 1279 (discussing plaintiffs' sense of satisfaction in seeing de-
fendant made to suffer).
58. Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 4, at 1279 (advocating retribution as
valid justification for punitive damages). Some commentators view revenge as pa-
tently inappropriate to a "civilized" legal system. Id. at 1279 n.114.
59. The basis in moral theory of the retributive rationale for punitive damages
is thoroughly explored in Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 16, at 708-13. See
generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILrTY 235-37 (1982) [hereinafter
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSmLITY] (discussing different theories used to jus-
tify retribution); Kuklin, supra note 16; Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 4, at
1279-82.
60. This characterization of punitive damages is common. See, e.g., Smith v.
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (using term "quasi-crimi-
nal," but noting that punitive damages are unaccompanied by types of safeguards
present in criminal proceedings). See generally Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note
16, at 709 n.14 (discussing characterization of punitive damages as quasi-criminal).
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"restitution" for the theft, both to the victim and society.61
When an actor intentionally violates the rights of another per-
son, the actor "steals" the victim's autonomy, reflecting an assertion
that the thief is more worthy than the victim. If such thefts of au-
tonomy were not subjected to penalties in addition to the restora-
tion of the stolen goods (compensatory damages), the rectification
of the transaction would be incomplete. This is because such theft
transactions contain two distinct components: (1) the transfer of
goods from the victim to the thief and (2) the deliberately wrongful
nature of the transfer in violation of the plaintiff's vested rights-
the illicit transfer of freedom from the victim to the thief. Punish-
ment, through punitive damages, serves to restore the equality of
the victim in relation to the thief by diminishing the extra worth
and freedom held illicitly by the thief that was stolen from the vic-
tim. The law in this manner reaffirms the equal worth of all and
the duty of each person to respect-to assign equal worth to-the
rights of others. 62
Punitive damages also serve an important retributive, restitu-
tionary interest for society. The theft-of goods and freedom dimin-
ishes the worth of all law-abiding members of society in relation to
the thief. When persons in the community agree to rules establish-
ing the boundaries of their legal rights, they each surrender in the
process their freedom to violate other persons' boundaries in pur-
suit of their own personal objectives. This is, of course, a reciprocal
sacrifice which contemplates that all citizens share equally in this
restriction, upon their individual freedoms. When a thief intention-
ally intrudes into another person's zone of rights, he assigns to him-
self more than the equal share of freedom the community assigned
by law to him. In comparison to the thief, law-abiding members of
society are impoverished in proportion to the gain appropriated by
the law-breaker. In this respect, the thief has stolen value from soci-
ety by breaking the reciprocal security pact based on equal rights. 6 3
By punishing intentional law-breakers, society restores all its mem-
bers to a position of equal worth, and reinforces the confidence of
law-abiders in the basic fairness of the legal system and in the utility
of their personal decisions to obey the law.64 Punitive damages,
61. Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 16, at 709-10.
62. Id. at 711-12.
63. For a further discussion of the notion of wrongdoer as thief, see id. at 708-
13.
64. See generally CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 121-26 (1970); L.
FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAw 29 (1968); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 193
(1961) (noting that sanctions serve not as normal motive for obedience, but as
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thus, have an important retributive role in serving to force flagrant
offenders to repay their "debts" to-and to restore the equality of-
both their victims and society.
3. Deterrence
In their retributive role, punitive damages serve to rectify in a
moral sense some of the negative effects of the wrongdoer's prior
misconduct. Probably most courts and commentators, however,
consider the predominant purpose of punishment in general, and
punitive damages in particular, to be deterrence-the prevention
of similar misconduct in the future. 65 While the practical effective-
ness of punishment in deterring misbehavior remains a perplexing
source of study and debate, 66 most commentators agree that pun-
ishment sometimes does achieve at least some measure of
deterrence. 67
The effectiveness of punitive damages in deterring gross mis-
conduct depends significantly upon two principal factors: (1)
whether the law in fact regularly catches and punishes persons who
flagrantly violate the rights of other persons and (2) whether poten-
tial offenders understand that the law proscribes, and that enforcers
are likely to punish, their contemplated misbehavior. 68 Because it
is common knowledge that misconduct, in fact, often goes unde-
tected and unpunished, punitive damages help to deter misconduct
by serving to sensationalize, and hence to publicize, the apprehen-
sion and punishment of offenders found guilty of egregious mis-
conduct. Such awards are thought to deter by informing potential
offenders on a variety of things: (1) that certain types of conduct
violating the interests of other persons are improper and subject to
legal remedy, as discussed in the educative function discussion ear-
lier;69 (2) that intentional and other flagrant violations of the law
are further subject to punishment in amounts exceeding the return
of the stolen goods and (3) that, although punishment may be un-
guarantee that those who would voluntarily obey shall not be sacrificed to those
who would not); 10 HALSBURY, THE LAws OF ENGLAND 306 (1909).
65. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977) (recogniz-
ing deterrence as function of punitive damages); HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSI-
BILITY, supra note 59, at 128-29 (characterizing deterrence as utilitarian goal of
punishment); Owen, PunitiveDamages, supra note 4, at 1283 (stating that central
purpose of most punishment is to deter similar misbehavior in future).
66. Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 4, at 1283 n.130; see also Owen, Moral
Foundations, supra note 16, at 714-16.
67. Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 4, at 1283.
68. See id.
69. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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certain, it is likely enough (because of the monetary incentive given
victims to prosecute such offenses) and may be large enough to
take the apparent profitability out of contemplated thefts. In sum,
the deterrence message directed at would-be thieves is that the
price of getting caught, discounted by the risk thereof, exceeds the
value of the booty.
This deterrence rationale is especially applicable in contexts
involving repetitive profit-seeking misbehavior where the wrongful-
ness of an actor's conduct is not readily apparent. The manufac-
ture and sale of thousands of consumer products across the nation
involves the potential for this type of hidden misbehavior. If a man-
ufacturer makes and sells a product it knows to be defective, many
persons may be injured without their realizing that the vague and
otherwise arcane rules of products liability law were violated at all,
much less that they were violated in a flagrant manner. When such
a manufacturer is caught and punished with a punitive damage as-
sessment, such damages are intended to serve in part as a kind of
surrogate "filler" for the compensatory damages of those persons
who do not pursue claims against the manufacturer. In this way,
manufacturers are informed that they may ultimately be forced to
pay in full, albeit only roughly, the price of all the harm resulting
from their sale of products known to be defective, and maybe more.
Thus, punitive damage awards provide a signal that the law will not
tolerate the generation of illicit profits through exploitation of the
vagueness in the liability rules and the resulting under-enforcement
of responsibility for compensatory damages. Instead, punitive as-
sessments put manufacturers and other actors on notice that the
law will force them to disgorge all such ill-gotten gains, and possibly
much more.
4. Compensation
Although it is frequently said that the purpose of punitive dam-
ages is to punish the defendant and to deter misbehavior-not to
compensate the plaintiff-punitive damages do indeed serve a vari-
ety of important compensatory roles.70 As seen above, such awards
serve the restitutionary purpose that underlies their retributive
function and their provision of "extra" money is what fuels the pri-
vate prosecutor engine of the law-enforcement function, as dis-
cussed below. More directly, such awards also serve to reimburse
the plaintiff for losses not ordinarily recoverable as compensatory
70. See generally Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 4, at 1295.
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damages, such as actual losses the plaintiff is unable to prove or for
which the rules of damages do not provide relief, including and
most importantly, the expenses of bringing suit.
Many of a plaintiff's actual losses, particularly those involving
intangible harm, simply are not compensable under the ordinary
rules of compensatory damage liability. For example, a severely in-
jured person who is rendered immobile for many months may lose
a number of important interpersonal relationships and will proba-
bly suffer a large variety of missed (and often unknown) opportuni-
ties. There is no practical way for the law to measure such
speculative or at least non-quantifiable losses, as real as they may be.
Ordinarily, therefore, in fairness to the injurer, such losses are ex-
cluded from the accident law compensation system and left to re-
main instead upon the plaintiff as a risk of life. Yet, when the
defendant inflicts injury intentionally upon the plaintiff or pursues
his private interests in a manner that he knows will put the plaintiff
at substantial undue risk, the equities of the situation change con-
siderably, and responsibility for ordinarily nonrecoverable emo-
tional and other intangible losses properly may be placed upon the
guilty party.
Although most courts and many commentators fail to include
the payment of attorneys' fees and other costs of litigation as ajus-
tificatory basis for punitive damages, the plaintiff's responsibility
for these substantial costs provides a compelling argument for puni-
tive damages in appropriate cases. Because at least one-third of the
plaintiff's recovery ordinarily is expended on legal fees, a verdict
that does not include a sum for these expenses almost always leaves
the plaintiff substantially worse off financially than he or she was
before the injury. And whether or not requiring the injured plain-
tiff to suffer this significant detriment makes sense in the ordinary
case, surely it is illogical and unjust in the type of context where
punitive damages are proper. In such cases, surely it is the thief-
not the victim-who should pay the costs of activating and driving
the legal system to restore the stolen goods to their rightful owner.
It seems self-evident that a defendant who has intentionally or wan-
tonly injured another may fairly be required to make the plaintiff
truly whole again. 71
71. Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 4, at 1297-98.
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5. Law Enforcement
Punitive damages are frequently criticized for allowing "wind-
falls" to plaintiffs in addition to compensation for the losses that
were actually sustained.7 2 Yet, this objection overlooks the impor-
tant fact that it is the very existence of a prospective windfall that
helps to motivate reluctant victims to press their claims and enforce
the rules of law. In so energizing the law through increased en-
forcement, punitive damage assessments serve instrumentally to
promote each of the underlying substantive objectives of punitive
damages-education, retribution, deterrence and compensation.
Thus, punitive damages have a vital procedural function, which may
be termed "law enforcement," in providing the mechanism for
achieving the other substantive objectives of the doctrine. 73
The law enforcement goal, therefore, is closely intertwined
with each of the other functions of punitive damages, but it is most
closely tied to deterrence. In a sense, law enforcement is the oppo-
site side of the deterrence coin, and vice versa. Deterrence may be
viewed as operating ex ante, in preventing prospective wrongdoers
from violating the rules, whereas law enforcement may be seen as
operating ex post, in catching and punishing wrongdoers who are
not deterred. Yet, the law enforcement potential of such awards
might also be viewed as operating ex ante, in providing a warning to
persons contemplating wrongdoing of the consequences of such
misconduct. If law enforcement proves successful in this respect,
then the wrongdoing will have been deterred, ex post. And so the
law enforcement-deterrence coin forever turns.
As is true with the deterrence function, law enforcement serves
to increase compliance with the rules of law.74 Few, if any, legal
rules are perfectly obeyed or enforced. Violations are apt to be es-
pecially prevalent when the unlawful, activity is profitable for the
violator, when violations are difficult to detect or to prove, when
violations appear morally neutral, when the rules are vague, when
enforcement of the rules is infrequent and when punishment is
light. By helping to finance the detection, proof and punishment
of flagrant violations of the rules, punitive damages increase the
72. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir.
1967) (discussing problems of windfalls caused by punitive damages awards).
73. Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 4, at 1287; see also St. Luke Evangelical
Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, 568 A.2d 35 (Md. 1990) (holdingjury could con-
sider attorney's fees incurred when calculating awards of punitive damages).
74. By discouraging deliberate rule violations, punitive damages accordingly
enhance compliance with law and promote the public good. Owen, Moral Founda-
tions, supra note 16, at 715.
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likelihood that wrongdoers will be identified in the first instance
and adequately punished in the second. To the extent that poten-
tial wrongdoers who are acting rationally perceive this increase in
the probability and size of penalties and the commensurate reduc-
tion in the profitability of their 'contemplated misconduct, viola-
tions of the substantive rules of law should be deterred and hence,
compliance with the law should be improved.
More particularly, the law enforcement function of punitive
damages operates as follows. After an injury occurs, if the victim
(or his attorney) discovers that the injurer flagrantly disregarded
the victim's rights, the prospect, of a' punitive damage recovery
serves as a compensatory incentive for the'victim (and his attorney)
to pursue the matter against the flagrant offender. Since punitive
damages are not recoverable on their own, but are dependent upon
the flagrant violation of some underlying substantive right and
duty, the recovery of such damages requires in the process that the
victim prove and enforce the substantive rules of liability which
otherwise might go unprosecuted. Thus, the prospect of punitive
damages awards serve as a kind of bounty, inducing injured victims
to serve as "private attorneys general," increasing the number of
wrongdoers who are pursued, prosecuted and eventually "brought
to justice."75 This assistance is important, because many serious
misdeeds deserving punishment are beyond the reach of the crimi-
nal law and the public prosecutor. Thus, a limitation in the realm
of criminal justice 76 is partially remedied, and the "private prosecu-
tor" is rewarded with a "private fine" for his "public service in bring-
ing the wrongdoer to account."77
In sum, the variety of goals -served by punitive damages present
a powerful case for making them generally available within a system
of private law. Yet, such damages are not without some problems,
and it is to those that the inquiry now will turn.
75. Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 4, at 1287-88; see, e.g.,Jackson v.Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 403 (5th Cir.) (noting that punitive damages
serve to motivate private attorneys general to bring suit), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022
(1986); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 347 (1872) (observing that punitive damages
encourage prosecution of lawsuits). See generally Bruce Chapman & Michael Tre-
bilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in Search of a Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REv. 741,
779-81 (1988) (discussing role of private enforcement of law); Rustad & Koenig,
supra note 17, at 1322-26 (discussing private attorney general function of punitive
damages).
76. This limitation on the role of criminal law is often proper because of the
strong reasons for preferring the civil to the criminal justice systems in marginal
areas. See infra § III A(3) of the text.
- 77. Neal v. Newburger Co., 123 So. 861, 863 (Miss. 1929) (stating proposition
but affirming denial of punitive damages on particular facts).
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III. THE CRITICISMS CRITIQUED
Punitive damages are subject to a number of recurring criti-
cisms, some with merit and some without. The criticisms have been
repeated in one form or another time and time again, in every fo-
rum in which punitive damages are debated, and the doctrine can-
not be fully understood without considering each of the major
kinds of criticisms to which it is exposed. While certain criticisms
are examined further in section IV below, in connection with re-
form proposals,78 it should be helpful first to examine and critique
in turn each of the major forms of objection.
A. Confusion of Tort and Criminal Law
1. Because punitive damages are "punitive" rather than compensa-
tory, they "mar" the symmetry of the law.
This argument, developed in the nineteenth century, is based
on a theoretically pure, abstract model of the law in which the law
of torts and the law of crimes are perfectly defined in terms that are
completely exclusive of one another. The idea is that each legal
domain should be entirely unique unto itself, such that there is no
valid overlap of definitions or functions among the different catego-
ries of law. With the advent of legal realism in the early part of this
century, this kind of focus on architectural purity and symmetry in
the design of a society's legal structure resoundingly collapsed in
American legal thought. Arguments along such formalist lines to-
day deserve little attention in debating any legal issue.79 Moreover,
this type of formalist reasoning fails to recognize the historical and
functional nexus between the law of torts and the law of crimes,
and it ignores in particular the traditional and central role of admo-
nition in the law of torts.
2. Punitive damages are in the nature of criminal fines, yet defend-
ants are not afforded the usual safeguards of criminal procedure,
particularly the benefit of a higher burden of proof
This argument has some merit, because punitive damages do
stand somewhere between the law of torts and crimes. To the ex-
tent that the rationale for the criminal law protections apply to the
punitive damages context, such protections, modified for the con-
78. For a discussion of reform proposals, see infra notes 128-67 and accompa-
nying text.
79. "[M]ore is at stake in legal theory than elegance and symmetry." George
P. Fletcher, Corrective Justice for Moderns, 106 HAiv. L. REv. 1658, 1678 (1993) (re-
viewing JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992)).
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text, should be adopted. Thus, a "mid-level" burden of proof, such
as by "clear and convincing evidence," is not only appropriate, but
plainly necessary in the interest of fairness to the "accused."80 The
fairness problem in allowing a defendant to be punished too se-
verely in a single adjudication, or over and over again by different
private attorneys general prosecuting in separate actions what was
arguably a single act-such as the design and sale of a particular
type of product-are the kinds of problems that the criminal law
generally addresses through prohibitions against excessive fines
and double jeopardy. As addressed below in the discussion of mass
torts, this very serious problem of repetitive punitive damage awards
remains to date a problem without a satisfactory judicial or legisla-
tive resolution. 81
3. The very purpose of the criminal law is to punish and deter,
whereas the purpose of tort law is to compensate injured persons for
wrongfully inflicted harm, so that the purposes of punitive dam-
ages are already and better accomplished by and within criminal
law.
To the extent that this general argument captures the specific
arguments in criticisms (1) and (2), the replies should be the same.
At a more fundamental level, however, the criticism rests uncom-
fortably upon a premise that is deeply flawed. The premise is that
the criminal law is superior to the civil law when the two areas of
law might accomplish the same objectives, and that the criminal law
should therefore be expanded to deal with the law's incomplete-
ness in remedying coverage of social misbehavior.
In any nation devoted to personal freedom in substantial mea-
sure, this premise must be rejected out of hand as dangerous and
pernicious. The criminal law is far more condemnatory and intru-
80. The burden of proof in the civil system is "preponderance of the evi-
dence," which is less than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard required by
the criminal system. Daniels & Martin, supra note 16, at 8. "Other procedural
safeguards inherent in criminal procedure, but not in [the] civil [system], include
the right to counsel and the role and size of the jury." Id. See generally Dorsey D.
Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Juiy, 40 ALA. L. REv. 975, 991-99
(1988) (discussing evidentiary standards for punitive damages); Susan M. Peters,
Punitive Damages in Oregon, 18 WI AME1rE L. REv. 369, 406-25 (1982) (examining
argument that punitive damages are unconstitutional as denial of due process, as
creating double jeopardy and as cruel and unusual punishment); Comment, Crimi-
nal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 408, 435 (1967)
(arguing that only limited criminal safeguards are necessary when imposing puni-
tive damages).
81. For a discussion of the problem of repetitive punitive damage awards, see
infra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
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sive to personal liberty than is the civil law, and criminal sanctions
should be reserved for only the most extreme forms of misbehavior
that most clearly harm the public good. Where the private law can
as cheaply and successfully accomplish the same objectives, and
where public condemnation in the extreme by a criminal convic-
tion (and possibly imprisonment) is not required, the civil law
should be allowed to perform its office. Not only is the punitive
damages doctrine apt to perform the law-enforcement function
more cheaply than the criminal law, because of its partial funding by
the wrongdoer, but it also is apt to perform it better because of the
personal, monetary incentives that punitive damages provide to vic-
tim-enforcers and their lawyers.
B. Vagueness Generating Unprincipled Awards
1. Because of the vagueness in the standards for determining the de-
fendant's liability for punitive damages, juries have no legitimate
basis for determining whether or not to make such awards, which
invites juries to award punitive damages improperly on the basis
of passion, bias and prejudice rather than on the law.
This criticism to a large extent is well founded, and it requires
serious attention by the courts and perhaps the legislatures. The
standards in most jurisdictions defining when punitive damages are
appropriate are vague indeed, and neither juries nor judges are
generally provided with meaningful "tests" of when punitive dam-
ages are proper.82 The first approach to this problem should be to
reduce the vagueness in the prevailing verbal standards and to im-
prove their specificity, as further discussed below. However, the na-
ture of flagrant misconduct, like ordinary misconduct (negligence)
is such that it will always remain unsusceptible to precise and partic-
ularized definition. Consequently, although the formulation of def-
initional standards for punitive damages often may be improved,
vagueness is an inherent and necessary aspect of punitive damage
standards as with most other general definitions.
The vagueness in such standards as "reckless" or "wilful and
wanton" is both good and bad. The advantage to such vague stan-
82. The standard of liability for punitive damages is ordinarily defined in such
terms as "malice," "fraud," "oppression," "outrageous behavior," "conscious or
reckless indifference to the rights of others" or "wilful or wanton misbehavior."
Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 16, at 727; see also GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra
note 4, § 5.01 (listing standards by state); Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 16,
at 727-30 (pointing out deficiency in standards and objections to vagueness of
these standards); Owen, Problems, supra note 8, at 18-20 (criticizing conscious disre-
gard of consequences standard).
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dards lies in the discretion it provides to the trier of fact to apply
the doctrine flexibly to achievejustice on the individual facts of par-
ticular cases. The problem, of course, is that this same flexibility
can just as likely be used by a biased jury to pervert justice in any
particular case. But this does not mean that the law must throw up
its hands in despair and simply reject the doctrine as unworkable.
Instead, as a second-best approach to the vagueness problem,
punitive damages law should contain a variety of checks to help as-
sure that the standards, which necessarily will remain quite vague,
are applied in a manner that is as fair and accurate as possible.
What this requires of the trial judge is: first, that juries must be
instructed fully and precisely on the nature of punitive damages,
the standards for their availability and the conditions under which
such damages may or may not be applicable to the facts of the par-
ticular case; second, once such a verdict is returned, that the suffi-
ciency of the evidence for the award is carefully examined; and
finally, that written reasons be provided explicitly particularizing
the reasons why the award was or was not deserved in light of the
legal standards, the doctrine's goals and the facts of the particular
case. Just as importantly, appellate courts should similarly subject
the evidence in such cases to close scrutiny, and such courts should
also explain with specificity the reasons for upholding, reducing or
reversing such awards.
2. Because of the nature and vagueness of the standards for deter-
mining the amount of punitive damage awards, including consid-
eration of the defendant's wealth, juries have no legitimate basis
for determining proper amounts for such awards, thereby inviting
juries to render such verdicts in excessive amounts based upon
their passions, biases and prejudices rather than on the law.
As with the previous criticism, there is much merit in criticisms
about how amounts of punitive damages are determined by juries,
trial judges and appellate courts. Most courts permit a plaintiff to
prove the extent of the defendant's wealth on the punitive damages
measurement issue,8 3 and a minority of states, most notably Califor-
83. The Restatement provides that when punitive damages are permissible, the
trier of fact can consider the wealth of the defendant. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 908 (2) (1977); see id. § 908 cmt. e; see, e.g., Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d
191, 198 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding it appropriate to consider defendant's net worth
when assessing punitive damages), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 119 (1986); State of Wis.
Inv. Bd. v. Plantation Square Assoc., 761 F. Supp. 1569, 1577 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (stat-
ing that financial condition of defendant was relevant for discovery purposes
where punitive damages were at issue); Strauss v. Biggs, 525 A.2d 992, 1000 (Del.
1987) (admitting evidence of defendant's wealth to enable jury to assess punitive
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nia, now requires it.84 Because this type of proof may bias the jury
on other issues, however, it generally should be excluded from the
case at least until the underlying liability issues have been resolved,
as some states require.85
Whether evidence on wealth should be admissible at all on this
issue is a perplexing question.86 Evidence of the defendant's wealth
is generally thought to be an important consideration in determin-
ing the appropriate size of a punitive award on the conventional
reasoning that it takes more to punish a rich person than a poor
one.87 This intuitively correct assumption probably reflects the di-
minishing marginal utility of money; that is, a dollar is generally
thought to have more marginal value to a poor person than a rich
one.88 Therefore, for the law to inflict the same amount of pain
upon a rich person as a poor one, the law needs to deprive the rich
person of more dollars than the poor one. From this perspective,
the defendant's wealth would appear relevant to the determination
of appropriate amounts of punitive damage assessments, particu-
larly with regard to retributive justice.
Many commentators, on the other hand, despair of making
sense out of the notion of retribution and turn principally or com-
pletely to deterrence as the relevant goal. The marginal value of
damages appropriately); Herman v. Sunshine Chem. Specialities, Inc., 627 A.2d
1081 (N.J. 1993) (examining issues carefully); Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors,
Inc., 555 A.2d 800, 802-03 (Pa. 1989) (holding punitive damages must be propor-
tionate only to wealth of defendant and seriousness of acts committed); Lunsford
v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 472-73 (Tex. 1988) (allowing evidence of net worth for
limited purpose of assessing punitive damages). Contra Fowler v. Mantooth, 683
S.W.2d 250, 252-53 (Ky. 1984) (refusing to consider wealth in assessing punitive
damages).
84. Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Cal. 1991) (declaring that in-
formation on defendant's wealth is necessary for appellate review of alleged exces-
siveness of punitive award; instruction should direct jury to consider defendant's
financial condition).
85. See, e.g., Lunsford, 746 S.W.2d at 472 (allowing evidence of defendant's
wealth only for purposes of assessing punitive damages after liability issues have
been resolved).
86. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive Damages
and the Rule of Law: The Role of Defendant's Wealth, 18J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 415 (1989)
(setting forth arguments in support of considering defendant's wealth in assessing
punitive damages, but concluding that defendant's wealth is irrelevant to goal of
deterrence);Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendant's Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
413, 414 (1992) (maintaining that wealth is relevant to deterrence for risk adverse
individuals); Note, The Use of Evidence of Wealth in Assessing Punitive Damages in New
York, 44 ALB. L. REV. 422 (1980).
87. See, e.g., Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv.
1173, 1191 (1931) (discussing both positive and negative aspects of allowing jury to
consider defendant's wealth in punitive damages cases).
88. See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 433-36 (10th ed. 1976).
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money would seem to be relevant here, too, even if it is only one
among a variety of relevant considerations. Yet some commentators
who have advanced deterrence rationales for punitive damages gen-
erally have eschewed any role for wealth, regarding it as a perverse
and irrelevant indicator that should be excluded altogether from
the calculus of relevant factors, properly including such considera-
tions as the apparent profitability of the misconduct and the likeli-
hood of apprehension.8 9  Whether wealth should have a
continuing, proper role to play in the determination of punitive
damage assessments is a difficult question to which much more
thought needs to be devoted.
As is true with the vagueness problem in defining the basis for
punitive damages liability, there really is no entirely satisfactory an-
swer to the vagueness problem in determining the amount of such
damages. The flagrancy of the misconduct is thought to be the pri-
mary consideration in determining the amount of punitive dam-
ages, 90 yet putting the flagrancy notion to principled use in
ascertaining a proper amount of such damages is probably even
more difficult than in rendering the underlying liability determina-
tion. However, similar problems of indeterminacy surround other
forms of damages in private law, such as pain and suffering, mental
anguish and loss of reputation. Moreover, the criminal law has al-
ways had the problem of determining proper levels of punishment
for serious misconduct where the bases for decision involve a host
of intangible considerations. If juries, trial judges and appellate
courts.earnestly seek to apply the standards of measurement (such
as they may be) to the factual circumstances of the case, for the
purpose of achieving the goals of punitive damages, the determina-
tion of the amount of such awards should have at least some basis in
principle.
Because of the very real problems in finding a widely accepted
basis for determining the proper amount of punitive awards, some
legislatures and courts have adopted various arbitrary types of mea-
surement approaches that reduce or remove discretion from the
trier of fact. Perhaps the best approach along these lines is to limit
such damages to, or define them by, some multiple of the plain-
89. For a further discussion of this idea, see Abraham & Jeffries, supra note
86, at 418-21 (concluding that wealth is irrelevant). But see Arlen, supra note 86, at
428 (concluding that wealth is irrelevant only if all individuals are risk neutral, but
.since most individuals are risk averse, deterrence is optimized by consideration of
wealth).
90. Other factors include the defendant's wealth and the seriousness of the
plaintiff's injury. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 908(2) (1977).
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tiff's actual damages-for example, by doubling or trebling the
plaintiff's compensatory award. 91 As an alternative or supplement
to the multiple approach, the law might provide a floor for such
awards and/or a cap.92
Arbitrary rules of this type, perhaps in combination, are a par-
tial solution to the measurement problem, if an imperfect one. It
may be that such rules should contain an exception for certain
cases, such as: (1) those involving particularly reprehensible mis-
conduct, as perhaps existed in the Dalkon Shield development and
sale, 93 (2) those where the defendant profited or expected to profit
from the misconduct in excess of what the arbitrary rules provide,
as in the United States Supreme Court TXO case, (3) those where
the defendant has continued the misconduct after getting caught
and seems likely to continue it in the future, (4) those where the
arbitrary rules provide for an amount of punishment that is clearly
too harsh and undeserved or (5) those where for some other rea-
son an application of the arbitrary rules appear clearly contrary to
justice in the case.
As is true with determining liability for punitive damages and
with the sentencing of criminal offenders, there is virtue as well as
vice in having standards that are vague for determining the size of
punitive damage assessments; the very vagueness that permits their
abuse permits as well their enlightened use to achieve individual-
ized justice tailored to the parties and the circumstances of the
case. Arbitrary measurement-control rules thus should be used
with caution to avoid over-mechanizing the administration of jus-
tice in cases involving flagrant misconduct.
91. For a discussion of arguments supporting the multiple approach, see
Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 16, at 731-38.
92. An example of a floor would be the greater of $10,000 or the plaintiff's
attorneys' fees. A cap might be defined in terms of a fixed monetary amount, or
might be related to some measure of the defendant's wealth. Except in the few
states providing a right or entitlement to punitive damages, caps should not be
constitutionally objectionable. Alabama is one of the entitlement states. See Hen-
derson v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1993) ($150,000 cap on puni-
tive damage awards imposed an unconstitutional, arbitrary limit on jury awards).
93. See infra note 109.
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C. Misdirection of Punishments and Rewards
1. To the extent that liability for punitive damages is insured, the
supposed punitive impact of such an award is avoided by the
wrongdoer who thereby escapes his proper punishment, undercut-
ting the supposed punitive or deterrent effect of such awards.
The punitive impact of punitive damage assessments surely is
diminished, or at least diverted, if liability insurance is permitted by
the law and is offered by insurers to cover such awards.94 At least
some insurers, who formerly insured against such losses under the
general liability provisions of insurance contracts, have tried to
avoid the risk by contractually excluding responsibility for such
losses. Thus, the insurance market itself (stung especially by re-
sponsibility for hundreds of millions of dollars in punitive damages
losses in asbestos cases) is addressing this problem to some extent.
Moreover, premium rates of many institutional insurers are based
at least partially on the particular insured's loss experience, which
makes such insurers pay in the long-run for at least some of such
"insured" losses.
The law could make the matter simple, however, by prohibit-
ing the insurance of such damages on grounds of public policy.
The law certainly would not tolerate or enforce insurance policies
against the risk of a jail sentence or of a criminal fine, at least not
where the crime involved moral turpitude. The cases95 are almost
evenly split on the insurability of punitive damages, 96 but it would
94. See Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 4, at 1308 (discussing studies inves-
tigating adverse effects of liability insurance); see also Grace M. Giesel, The Knowl-
edge of Insurers and the Posture of the Parties in the Determination of the Insurability of
Punitive Damages, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 355, 383-84 nn.137-43 (1991) (compiling
cases addressing issue of insurability in context of general liability and automobile
liability insurance). See generally George Priest, Insurability and Punitive Damages, 40
ALA. L. REV. 1009 (1989) (discussing confusion among current approaches regard-
ing insurability of punitive damages); Alan I. Widiss, Liability Insurance Coverage for
Punitive Damages? Discerning Answers to the Conundrum Created by Disputes Involving
Conflicting Public Policies, Pragmatic Considerations and Political Actions, 39 VILL. L.
REv. 455 (1994) (providing comprehensive review); Comment, Insurance for Puni-
tive Damages, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 459 (1976) [hereinafter Comment, Insurance for
Punitive Damages].
95. Statutes in at least two states provide that insurance contracts are not to be
construed as covering punitive damages, as in policy clauses, for example, that
provide insurance for "all sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to
pay as damages," unless such contracts expressly so provide. See, e.g., HAW. REV.
STAT. § 431-58 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-317 (1993). In Texas, punitive
damages coverage is prohibited in professional liability insurance contracts for
medical doctors. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.15-1, § 8 (1994). In Ohio, punitive
damages are prohibited in contracts for uninsured and underinsured motorist in-
surance. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Anderson 1994).
96. See generally BLATT ET AL., supra note 1, at 80-84; Giesel, supra note 94, at
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appear that the better-reasoned cases favor outlawing insurance
contracts for punitive damages liability, at least in the case of corpo-
rate defendants and malicious misconduct by individuals. 97 Recog-
nizing the absence of the principal's culpability in many instances
of vicarious liability, some states which generally prohibit punitive
damages insurance allow it in cases of true vicarious liability.98
There is an important caveat that undercuts the desirability of
a general rule prohibiting insurance against punitive damages lia-
bility. There was until very lately in this nation a trend, that appears
now to have slowed or stopped, toward liberalizing awards of puni-
tive damages and allowing them on vague standards without mean-
ingfuljudicial oversight. When the law is poorly defined and poorly
administered in these respects, the risk of undeserved punitive
damage awards is substantial, making insurance contracts for such
events much more reasonable. While insurance against properly
defined and administered punitive damages awards should quite
clearly be proscribed, fairness requires the allowance of insurance
against punitive awards that are randomly assessed or based on per-
sonal conduct that is not truly reprehensible. 99
nn.136-43 (compiling cases on insurability of punitive damages). The majority ap-
proach allows directly and vicariously assessed punitive damages to be insurable.
BLATr ET AL., supra note 1, at 80. However, some 18 states follow the minority
approach, under which punitive damages are not insurable if assessed directly
against the wrongdoer. Id. at 81. One treatise states that the trend, at present,
appears to be in favor of allowing insurance of punitive damages. SCHLUETER &
REDDEN, supra note 16, at 83. This conclusion appears questionable, and there
would appear to be no ascertainable "trend" at this time, either way. The jurisdic-
tions remain strongly split, and the nature of the issue has been changing recently
in ways that undermine any intelligible reference to the notion of a trend.
97. See, e.g., United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 920
F.2d 487, 490 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that insurance coverage for punitive dam-
ages is void as against Minnesota public policy); Home Ins. Co. v. American Home
Prods. Corp., 902 F.2d 1111, 1113 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that New York public
policy does not allow punitive damage insurance).
98. See generally Giesel, supra note 94, at 357 n.l 1 (noting that eight jurisdic-
tions allow insurance of vicariously impassed punitive damages).
99. In recognition of this problem, a number of states which generally pro-
hibit punitive damages insurance allow it in the absence of truly reprehensible
behavior. See generally Widiss, supra note 94. Moreover, the recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence on punitive damages, discussed infra § IV A, has already inspired
many courts to tighten the administration of such awards.
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2. Liability insurance, vicarious liability and governmental liability
all result in the punitive effect of punitive damage awards being
transferred to innocent third parties-other insureds, shareholders
and taxpayers-who themselves did not participate in the miscon-
duct and so are free from blame, and who consequently are made
to suffer illogically and unfairly by such awards.
This is the other half of the previous criticism which argued
that wrongdoers are not sufficiently made to suffer by punitive dam-
ages which are shifted to an insurer. In complementary fashion,
the present criticism argues that the suffering that does result from
punitive damages may come to rest unfairly on innocent persons
who themselves are not wrongdoers. Surely it is true that the puni-
tive effects of such awards should not be placed upon parties who
are truly "innocent," and the law must strive to assure that this does
not happen. Taxpayers are virtually always completely innocent,
and it makes little sense for the people through their laws to inflict
quasi-criminal punishment upon themselves for the misconduct of
governmental employees. The statutes and judicial rulings in most
states prohibiting the imposition of punitive damages against gov-
ernmental entities therefore seem entirely proper.100
The situation is otherwise with respect to punitive damages im-
posed vicariously upon a private corporation, and indirectly upon
the shareholders, for the gross misconduct of its servants in the
scope of their employment. 01 Punitive damages are proper in such
cases, especially if the misconduct is approved by the enterprise,
even if only tacitly. It would seem unwise to allow an institution to
take the benefits of "thefts" from other persons by its employees,
accomplished for the benefit of the enterprise. Institutions may
act, of course, only through their employees. Such persons may be
encouraged to pursue the enterprise's business with excessive zeal,
in knowing violation of the rights of others, if they are aware that
100. See, e.g., Smith v. Northeast Ill. Regional Commuter R.R., 569 N.E.2d 41,
43 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991) (certain local public entities are exempt from punitive dam-
age liability); see also Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 263 (1981)
(federal government is immune from punitive damages absent congressional ac-
tion to contrary); Rohweder v. Aberdeen Prod. Credit Ass'n, 765 F.2d 109, 113
(8th Cir. 1985) (United States cannot be held liable for punitive damages in ab-
sence of express statutory authorization).
101. See BLArr ET AL., supra note 1, at 85 (discussing trends in vicariously as-
sessed punitive damages); see also GHJRDI & KIRCHER, supra note 4, § 24 (discuss-
ing "conservative" and "liberal" view regarding vicarious liability for punitive
damages); Giesel, supra note 94, at n.139 (noting that eight jurisdictions allow in-
surance of vicariously-assessed punitive damages); Comment, Insurance for Punitive
Damages, supra note 94, at 459 (discussing insurance for vicariously assessed puni-
tive damages).
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the enterprise will be shielded from full accountability for the
harmful consequences of such illicit decisions. 10 2
Principles of restitution argue for a firm's vicarious responsibil-
ity for punitive assessments. To the extent that an employee's mis-
conduct in pursuit of corporate profit flagrantly violates the rights
of others, the profits "earned" by the activity may be seen as tainted,
and hence as not properly belonging to the enterprise. "Innocent"
shareholders thus have no fair claim to such "illicit profits"-which
may be seen as a form of unjust enrichment not belonging to them
at all. Although close measurement of such profits will no doubt be
highly problematic, punitive damages in such cases serve roughly to
recoup from the corporation's Coffers the unjust rewards of its em-
ployee's misdeeds and to return the booty to the victim, its rightful
owner. Nor will the market allow such enterprises to slough off
such resulting "losses" upon its innocent customers, whether of
goods or services, because the pricing policies of the enterprise's
law-abiding competitors will remain unaffected.
3. Since punitive damages are noncompensatory, they provide the
plaintiff with an undeserved "windfall," and the public-whose
interests are supposedly vindicated by such assessments-is left
without any monetary benefit from the penal fine.
The "windfall" argument is largely answered above in terms of
the important instrumental effect of such "windfalls" in achieving
the educative, retributive (or restitutionary), deterrent, compensa-
tory and law enforcement functions of punitive damages. However,
where a plaintiff recovers an enormous verdict, far in excess of what
is needed to serve these five functions, 103 then it seems appropriate
102. See generally Comment, Insurance for Punitive Damages, supra note 94, at
466 (discussing consequences of permitting punitive damages insurance in vicari-
ous liability context).
103. Ordinarily, once a plaintiff's compensatory damages are doubled or
trebled (or perhaps quadrupled) by the punitive award, any additional amount of
punitive damages is likely to be an "excess" award, representing the wrong done to
the public, which should go to the state. The absolute size of the compensatory
and punitive awards are important in determining the proper multiple, assuming
that the judge or jury has discretion on this issue. Thus, if compensatory damages
are of a relatively low amount in absolute terms-say, $10,000-then a punitive
award of two or even three times this amount may just cover the plaintiff's attor-
neys' fees and litigation expenses in a complex suit against a major corporation.
Such cases might well require a larger punitive award to assure the plaintiff some
measure of a retributive, restitutionary component to the award over and above
the underlying compensatory component. By contrast, if a plaintiff recovers com-
pensatory damages of millions of dollars in a serious injury case, punitive damages
greater than one or two times the compensatory award might often fairly be re-
garded as an "excess" award subject to recoupment by the state. However, the
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for the "excess" portion to be handed over to the public's represen-
tative, perhaps to finance public law enforcement in the future, or
for some other public good, preferably to help ameliorate the type
of social problem attributable to the type of misconduct engaged in
by the defendant. 10 4
4. In mass disaster cases, allowing punitive damages to early plain-
tiffs may bankrupt defendants and so deprive later plaintiffs of
funds to cover their actual damages, to say nothing of over-punish-
ing the defendants.
This is a real and serious problem in the worst mass disaster
cases, where hundreds or thousands of persons are maimed or
killed because of the flagrant misconduct of an enterprise. 105 The
clearest present example involves the litigation against the asbestos
industry for selling an insidiously dangerous product over many de-
cades without warning of its dangers. 10 6 As a result, tens of
thousands of persons have died already, and many thousands more
will die from mesothelioma and become disabled from asbestosis, a
serious lung disorder, for decades to come.10 7 Compensatory dam-
ages alone will amount to many billions of dollars, and courts have
assessed hundreds of millions of dollars in punitive damages against
a number of companies in the industry for failing to warn of a dan-
ger they knew existed. More than a dozen manufacturers (most
administrative difficulties and potential for abuse in fine tuning multiples begins
to undercut their principal advantage of substituting measurement standards that
are certain for those that are vague and subject to the resulting vagaries of unbri-
dled discretion.
104. For a review of the statutes mandating a division of punitive damage
awards between the plaintiff and the state, see GHLADI & KIRCHER, supra note 4,
§ 21.16 (compiling list of states that require percentage of punitive damages award
to be assigned to state or public entity); Amelia J. Toy, Statutory Punitive Damage
Caps and the Profit Motive: An Economic Perspective, 40 EMORY L.J. 303 (1991).
105. See generally David H. Bernstein, Punitive Damages in Mass Products Liabil-
ity, 1 PROD. LiAB. L.J. 327 (1990) (reviewing problems of multiple assessments);
Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of
Aggregation and.Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. R.v. 815, 816 (1992)
(examining problems inherent in mass injury litigation); Richard A. Seltzer, Puni-
tive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and
Control, 52 FoiDHAm L. REv. 37 (1983). But see Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Pro-
priety of Awarding Punitive Damages to Separate Plaintiffs Bringing Successive Actions
Arising Out of Common Incident or Circumstances Against Common Defendant or Defend-
ants, 11 A.L.R.4TH 1261, 1262 (1982 & Supp. 1993) (noting that although there is
some concern about possibility of defendant becoming bankrupt, that result is un-
likely because of judicial controls).
106. See Joseph A. Page, Asbestos and the Dalkon Shield: Corporate America on
Tria4 85 MicH. L. REv. 1324 (1987); Saks & Blanck, supra note 105, at 816.
107. See authorities collected infra note 111.
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notably Johns-Manville, or Manville) have gone into bankruptcy, in
part because of liability for punitive damages on top of a crushing
liability for the actual losses of so many plaintiffs.' 08
What to do with punitive damages in such situations 0 9 is a
problem of enormous complexity which requires much analysis and
ingenuity. There are a host of problems with punitive damages in
this context, examined at length by commentators n1 and courts,"'
and only a couple of issues can be briefly touched on here. One
proposal that is quite clearly unsatisfactory as a general approach is
a single, aggregate punitive award for division among the entire
108. See generallyJackson v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751
F. Supp. 649, 656 (E.D. Tex. 1990). Although punitive damage payouts in the
asbestos cases are proportionately very small, the potential threat of such assess-
ments remains a significant factor in the litigation and settlement calculus.
109. Another situation which demonstrates such mass awards of punitive
damages is the litigation surrounding the Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine device
that injured thousands of women, bankrupting its manufacturer, the A. H. Robins
Company. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 769, 776 (4th Cir. 1989) (discussing
personal injury trust fund created to process claims of parties injured by debtor's
Dalkon Shields); Page, supra note 106; Seltzer, supra note 105, at 72 (discussing
Dalkon Shield class actions).
110. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 105; Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 4,
at 1322-25; Seltzer, supra note 105.
111. See, e.g., Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1385-86 (3d Cir.), modified in part,
13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Dunn,
114 S. Ct. 650 (1993) (collecting state and federal cases); Wammock v. Celotex
Corp., 826 F.2d 990, 995 (lth Cir. 1987) (asbestos litigation), opinion withdrawn,
835 F.2d 818 (11th Cir. 1988); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832,
838 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.) (MER/29, cholesterol-lowering drug litigation);
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. ('Jackson III"), 781 F.2d 394, 396 (5th Cir.
1986) (asbestos litigation; terminating earlier debates in "Jackson II," 750 F.2d
1314 (5th Cir. 1985) (8-1-5 decision), and 'Jackson I," 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984)
(3-0 decision), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986)); Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiber-
glas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 865 (Iowa 1994) (asbestos litigation; noting that
"[t]he vast majority of state and federal courts 'that have addressed the issue have
declined to strike punitive damages awards merely because they constituted repeti-
tive punishment for the same conduct.' "); Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512
A.2d 466, 481 (N.J. 1986) (asbestos litigation). See generally Nadel, supra note 105
(collecting cases on propriety of multiple assessments of punitive damages from
common occurrence).
Although the nature of the underlying policy discussion has remained essen-
tially unchanged over the years, the framework for the debate has shifted in the
last several years from the common law to the Constitution. As discussed below,
the Supreme Court has ruled that repetitive punitive damage assessments for a
single course of behavior are not generally proscribed by the prohibitions against
double jeopardy or excessive fines, at least if none of the "penal fine" goes to the
state. Although the Court has indicated that the Due Process Clause places some
constraints on such awards, it has to date avoided ruling on whether due process in
some manner restrains repetitive assessments of this type. For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's recent punitive damages jurisprudence, see infra notes 129-54
and accompanying text.
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class of victims.112 Alluring at first glance, this approach is fraught
with far too many problems of theory and administration to be
helpful in cases involving recurring claims, and it has been rejected
by almost every court that has considered it.113 One thing that is
certain is that judges in such cases must closely monitor the sol-
vency of defendants to insure that available assets are not prema-
turely consumed by excessive early punitive awards to the detriment
of subsequent plaintiffs.1 14
An interesting approach applied recently in at least a couple of
aggregated asbestos cases has been the assignment by the jury of a
punitive multiplier, from zero to two or three, to the compensatory
awards assessed to each defendant.11 5 This type of mass multiplier
approach has the very decided advantage of being administratively
convenient, and hence efficient, as well as assuring the equal treat-
ment of each of the aggregated plaintiffs in regard to one another
and in regard to each defendant. By its nature, however, it exposes
to particular risk future plaintiffs who may end up with nothing left
in the corporate tills even for their actual damages. Thus, courts
must be cautious in assigning or allowing multipliers when the ag-
gregate payouts might bankrupt the defendants. Such courts must
also maintain especially close supervision of such litigation as it pro-
gresses. Whether or not such multipliers are allowed, courts should
be prepared to reduce punitive damages assessments-and possibly
to eliminate them altogether-when a mass disaster defendant's fi-
112. Cf GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1) (1987) (providing that only one pu-
nitive damages award may be recovered from defendant in products liability ac-
tion, regardless of number of suits brought). Compare McBride v. General Motors
Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1580 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (holding § 51-12-5.1(e) (1) uncon-
stitutional), with Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993) (contra).
See infra note 163.
113. See generally Nadel, supra note 105.
114. Yet, early plaintiffs need and deserve extra compensatory incentives and
rewards for forging what are often long and difficult trails of discovery and proof
to the first couple of punitive awards. Subsequent plaintiffs, in a very real sense,
ride to favorable settlements and verdicts-for compensatory as well as punitive
damages - on the coattails of the firstcomers. However, it usually will only be the
first few plaintiffs (and their lawyers) who deserve such extra punitive awards.
Thereafter, the interests of subsequent plaintiffs should probably be considered
equal, with regard to the division of the punitive spoils, without regard to the time
of arrival at the courthouse. See Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 4, at 1319-25.
115. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 657-58 (E.D. Tex.
1990) (allowingjury to assess punitive damages multiplier, ranging from 1.5 to 3.0
depending on defendant, for each dollar of actual damages). See generally Glen 0.
Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA. L. REv. 1481,
1490-96 (1992) (discussing the Cimino approach as one alternative to traditional
method of valuation in class action claims); Saks & Blanck, supra note 105, at 821
(discussing aggregating method and statistical approach used in Cimino).
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nancial viability becomes truly threatened by the litigation and the
payouts.11 6
D. Social Harm from Excessive Punishment
1. Because of the unpredictability of punitive damage awards, and
the possibility of multi-million dollar "bonanzas," plaintiffs and
their lawyers are encouraged to bring nonmeritorious lawsuits and
are discouraged from settling lawsuits that include claims for pu-
nitive damages.
Sometimes referred to as the "eager-plaintiff" problem, this
criticism has little merit. First, it should be remembered that ren-
dering the plaintiff "eager" is precisely what fuels the law-enforce-
ment engine of punitive damages, as discussed above.1 17 Second, it
is unlikely that many plaintiffs or their attorneys will risk the cost,
time and trouble of instigating a nonmeritorious lawsuit simply be-
cause they think that for some reason (other than merit) they will
win the lawsuit, and will go on to win a punitive damages award to
boot.
Much more likely than the initiation of wholly nonmeritorious
suits is the temptation for plaintiffs' lawyers to routinely add what
are usually nonmeritorious claims for punitive damages to meritori-
ous compensatory damages actions. This very real problem raises
serious ethical considerations for lawyers who program their com-
puters to include boilerplate punitive damage claims as standard
items in complaints. 118 In such cases, courts have available effective
remedies in the form of sanctions and the assessment of costs that
they should use to assure that the law is not abused by routine asser-
tions of nonmeritorious claims. Moreover, a number of legislatures
have reasonably resolved the matter by precluding such claims until
a prima facie showing of their appropriateness is made to the
court.1 19
116. Thus, multipliers should perhaps be made conditional, and subject to
being opened for reconsideration upon a change in circumstances-such as a sub-
stantial deterioration in the firm's financial condition or, possibly, a substantial
increase in future claims.
117. For a discussion of the law enforcement function of punitive damages in
encouraging plaintiffs to bring claims, see supra notes 72-77 and accompanying
text.
118. It is not the programming of computers that may be unethical, of course,
but allowing such claims to be included regularly in complaints without sufficient
investigation to form a reasonable belief that they are supported by the facts of the
particulai case.. •
119. For a further discussion of this practice, see infra note 158 and accompa-
nying text.
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As far as discouraging settlement, the possibility of recovering a
substantial punitive award may indeed make a plaintiff reluctant to
settle a meritorious suit for an amount reflecting the settlement value
of the action based solely upon the probability of success and the
amount of compensatory damages the plaintiff is likely to recover.
Presumably, this will be the case where the plaintiff believes two
things: first, that he is entitled to recover compensatory damages
under the principles of tort law (or other substantive basis of recov-
ery) and compensatory damages law; and second, that he will be
able to prove at trial that the defendant was flagrantly at fault in
committing the tort or otherviolation of legal right-or at least
make out a plausible claim to this effect. Yet, once again, this basi-
cally is the purpose of punitive damages. Accordingly, it is no won-
der that defendants would wish to settle such cases merely at their
compensatory settlement value-just as a thief discovered by the
police would wish to "settle" his legal difficulty by returning the sto-
len property to the victim.120
2. In part because of the unpredictability of punitive damage awards,
whether and to what extent they really do effect deterrence is prob-
lematical, and in fact, such damages may result in excessive deter-
rence which may discourage entrepreneurs and others from
engaging in socially beneficial activities.
This "excessive deterrence" argument is fundamentally empiri-
cal and speculative, because it is difficult to ascertain how effective
the threat of punitive damage awards really is in altering the behav-
ior of persons and institutions contemplating conduct of various
types.' 2 ' Assuming that punitive damages really do have a substan-
tial deterrent impact on the decisions of potential actors, 22 the ac-
120. The computation of the "true" settlement value of cases involving a sub-
stantial possibility of punitive damages will involve much more in the way of art
than of science, and the settlement of such cases may well be more difficult as a
result. Yet, defendants in such cases are likely to be particularly anxious to settle
without a trial in order not only to avoid the financial risk in the particular case at
bar, but also to avoid the risk of adverse publicity over revelation of their miscon-
duct, which, by hypothesis, is flagrant and extreme.
121. For a discussion of the threat and consequences of excessive awards, see
generally GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 4, § 18.
122. As a general proposition, this may well be a dubious assumption. See E.
Donald Elliott, Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively, 40
ALA. L. REv. 1053, 1060 (1989) (noting little evidence that punitive damages either
do or do not deter corporate misconduct); Owen, Foreword, supra note 16, at 313-
14 (arguing that other aspects of being involved in litigation already deter -such
conduct, thereby making punitive damages an ineffective deterrent in many
cases).
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tors who are risk-averse will indeed be excessively deterred.
Accordingly, such actors will engage in types and levels of behavior
that is "suboptimal," to coin an expression that may sound suspi-
ciously like economic jargon. In such cases, actors will suffer an
unfortunate loss of personal autonomy or freedom, and society will
suffer waste.
The excessive-deterrence criticism is thus, in part, well-
founded, and to this extent the punitive damage doctrine is unde-
sirable. Yet, the analysis on this point so far is incomplete. To com-
plete the analysis, one must also consider the doctrine's positive
effects on both personal freedom and social utility (and economic
efficiency). That is, the availability of punitive damages is designed
to force actors to respect the legal rights of potential victims from
highly untoward invasion, which serves to increase the freedom of
potential victims and, commensurately, to decrease the ability of
potential malefactors to obtain the freedom owned by others by
stealth and theft.1 23
Social utility and economic efficiency should be improved by
proper awards of punitive damages, as economic theorists often
contend. 24 By counterbalancing the enforcement costs con-
fronting victims, punitive damages deter rational profit-maximizing
enterprises from seeking illicit profits that otherwise would appear
likely to be worth the risk and cost of getting caught. In this way,
punitive damages tend to move economic actors back toward the
point of optimal behavior, around which the substantive rules of
law generally are roughly centered.
It is impossible to know with confidence whether on balance
punitive damages will generate too much or too little deterrence of
good or bad behavior-or hence to know whether the doctrine on
balance generates a net gain or loss for society-because the matter
is almost entirely conjectural.12 5 One may take some comfort, per-
haps with reason, in assuming that properly-designed and adminis-
tered rules should, by hypothesis, expand the realm of personal
freedom and promote the greater economic and other social good.
However, coupled with such bold assumptions must be a commit-
ment to define, frame, confine and administer such rules of law-
123. This point is further developed in Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note
16, at 708-13.
124. E.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 273-311 (1987) (discussing economics of punitive damages in products
liability and industrial accident law).
125. In addition, the resolution of the question involves the comparison of
incommensurable values.
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that are by their very nature vague and easily subject to abuse-in a
manner that vigilantly protects potential defendants and the public
from unnecessary loss of freedom and social waste.
3. Because of the uncertainty and increased costs of defending and
paying punitive damage claims, the costs of products and services
are increased, commercial planning is destabilized and the na-
tion's industry is competitively disadvantaged in the world
economy.
It is probably true that the costs of defending punitive damages
claims and the resulting increase in insurance costs do raise the cost
of goods and services somewhat in this nation. Yet, the amount of
such "excess" costs that responsible firms in most industries incur is
probably quite small, and such costs appear to be substantially
counterbalanced by the variety of beneficial effects attributable to
the punitive damages doctrine discussed above. 126
As for whether such damages cause commercial instability, the
answer must be that to some extent they do. Manufacturers, banks,
investment houses, insurance companies and other enterprises will
not be able to predict with certainty precisely what type of misbe-
havior will be judged, often long after the event, as flagrantly im-
proper and deserving of significant legal sanction. This situation is
unfortunate for responsible enterprises that try to obey the law.
Nevertheless, in a properly administered system of punitive dam-
ages, firms that do respect the rights of others will be largely im-
mune from such assessments, even if occasionally they do face such
claims.
The risk of such assessments will be much greater for compa-
nies that care little whether their activities improperly cause harm
to the rights of their customers, other persons or other enterprises.
Punitive damages are designed to change such attitudes, or at least
to provide such companies with a monetary disincentive for violat-
ing the rights of others. Finally, the availability and proper use of
punitive damages should serve to completely destabilize the com-
mercial plans of flagrantly dishonest enterprises that prey upon the
public in deliberate disregard for the rights of others. Punitive
damages should help assure that enterprises operated in such a
manner are destabilized permanently for the public good.
The argument that punitive damages put American industry at
a competitive disadvantage in the world economy is difficult to un-
126. See supra notes 48-77 and accompanying text.
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derstand. It is probable that the competitive pricing structure of
most markets precludes irresponsible firms from passing along pu-
nitive damage assessments to customers in the form of higher
prices. Thus, malefacting enterprises will indeed be competitively
disadvantaged by punitive damages assessments, when such dam-
ages do their job in removing profit from the illicit behavior and
add a true penalty to boot. This is as it should be and is unrelated
to where the competition comes from, whether domestically or
from foreign lands. Furthermore, to the extent that the punitive
damages system requires responsible domestic manufacturers fre-
quently to defend and pay unmerited assessments of this type, the
system also requires the same of companies who do business in this
nation. The international competition argument, therefore, is sin-
gularly unpersuasive.
In sum, the punitive damages doctrine has a number-of troub-
ling characteristics, at least a couple of which are quite serious in-
deed. Yet, most of the doctrine's true problems can be satisfactorily
controlled, to a large extent, and many other supposed problems
vanish like the proverbial bat confronted with the light. Nonethe-
less, responsible management of the punitive damages doctrine re-
quires that the law reform itself as much as possible to minimize the
doctrine's many costs.
IV. REFORM PROPOSALS
As noted throughout this Article, there are a variety of "re-
form" proposals afoot, all designed to improve the fairness of the
theory or administration of punitive damages law. Perhaps the
most important point to note at the outset is that there is very little
agitation for the general repeal of the punitive damages doctrine.
It generally is perceived in this nation1 27 as an important doctrine
that helpfully checks and rectifies extreme misconduct. As seen
above, however, such damages hold substantial potential for abuse
and can be used improperly to cause enormous harm. Thus, there
is much room in the doctrine for beneficial reform. The following
sketch of reforms in punitive damages law is intended merely as a
survey, and one must turn to the reform literature for comprehen-
sive discussions of particular reforms. 128
127. Although other nations generally do not have a general doctrine of puni-
tive damages, a preliminary report of the British Law Commission recently recom-
mended widening their use in that nation. See CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note
55, at 173-78 (detailing recommendations for expanding use of punitive damages
in England).
128. See, e.g., GHLARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 4, § 21 (discussing various pro-
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A. Constitutional Reform
Because of the increase in multi-million dollar awards of puni-
tive damages and the widespread perception that the doctrine con-
tains some basic fairness problems, the United States Supreme
Court in four recent cases has examined the constitutionality of
such awards. 129 In none of the four cases decided so far has the
Court concluded that the Constitution requires any particular type
of rules for the assessment of such damages.
In the first case, Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont v. Kelco Dis-
posal, Inc.,130. the Court rejected an Excessive Fines Clause challenge
to a six million dollar punitive damages award, holding that the
Eighth Amendment does not apply to such assessments in civil cases
where the state does not share in the recovery.131 As legislatures
increasingly enact reform statutes requiring payment of a portion
of punitive damage awards to the state, the latter condition of the
Browning-Ferris holding suggests that the excessive fines issue may be
alive and well in such jurisdictions.
In the next and most important case to date, Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip,'3 2 the Court considered the applicability of
the Due Process Clause to punitive damages,, concluding that: (1)
the imposition of punitive damages on a vicarious liability basis is
posals for reform in several states); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 17 (arguing that
punitive damages reform is unnecessary); Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens,
Punitive Damages Reform-State Legislatures Can and Should Meet the Challenge Issued by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Haslip, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1365 (1993) (argu-
ing that state legislatures should follow Supreme Court's lead in establishing
guidelines for punitive damage awards); Toy, supra note 104 (discussing how state
legislatures' attempts at capping punitive damage awards undermine effect of pu-
nitive damages).
129. See Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp.
v. Alliance Resources Co., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
The Supreme Court's venture into the punitive damages domain has gener-
ated a spate of commentary .in the law reviews. See, e.g., Robinson & Abraham,
supra note 115, at 1507 (discussing substantive due process issues in context of
aggregation of mass tort claims); Volz & Fayz, supra note 16 (arguing that due
process should serve as limit to award of punitive damages); Paul J. Zwier, Due
Process and Punitive Damages, 2 UTAH L. REv. 407 (1991) (arguing that law regard-
ing punitive damages is adequate without implicating Due Process Clause). For a
helpful, "early" article, see Robert E. Riggs, Constitutionalizing Punitive Damages, 52
OHIO ST. L.J. 859 (1991) (arguing that courts should not use Due Process Clause
to regulate punitive damages). For an excellent overview of the constitutional is-
sues, see BOSTON, supra note 16, at ch. 4.
130. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
131. Id. at 260.
132. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
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not fundamentally unfair,133 (2) the common-law method for deter-
mining punitive damages is not per se unconstitutiona s13 4 and (3)
the punitive damages award in the case, about four times larger
than the compensatory damages verdict, was not so disproportion-
ately large as to violate due process. 135 The Court did indicate,
however, that due process does require that a system of punitive
damages law and administration may not give juries unbridled dis-
cretion. Further, the liability rules for such damages, on which ju-
ries are instructed, and the rules for judicial review must both
provide meaningful standards reflecting the objectives of such as-
sessments.13 6 Haslip thus establishes a due process structural cabin
within which both juries and courts must operate in order to accord
punitive damages the caution warranted by a doctrine of quasi-
criminal assessments.13 7
In the third case, TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Co., 138 the Court backtracked substantially from the well-reasoned
and balanced position it had outlined two years earlier in Haslip.
On evidence that the defendant had tried to cheat the plaintiff out
of millions of dollars, the Court in TXO upheld, against a charge of
constitutional excessiveness, a $10 million punitive damage ver-
dict-some 526 times greater than the compensatory award of
$19,000.1s9 The case was a strange one, and its constitutional signif-
icance is quite unclear. We now know that the present nine justices
are all on record as holding that there are certain procedural due
process limitations on assessments of punitive damages. In addi-
tion, it would seem that seven justices, those other than Justices
133. Id. at 14-15 (upholding Alabama common law doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior as rationally advancing state goal of minimizing fraud by imposing incentives
for principals to oversee actions of their agents).
134. Id. at 17 (noting that not only was this method in use before Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted, but courts have consistently upheld it against constitu-
tional attack).
135. Id. at 23-24 (justifying disparity between this punitive damages award and
fines imposed for insurance fraud because, under state statute for insurance fraud,
imprisonment may supplement any monetary fine).
136. Id. at 18-22. The vagueness in the traditional review standards, condi-
tioning reversal of a punitive damages awards on a "shock the conscience of the
court" standard, or on a determination that the jury was motivated by "passion or
prejudice," does not affront due process if the reviewing court makes particular-
ized Haslip-type findings in addition to applying the traditional standards of review.
Robertson Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 14 F.3d 373 (8th Cir. 1993) (en
banc).
137. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 449 U.S. 1, 18-22 (1991).
138. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
139. Id. at 2722-23.
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Scalia and Thomas, 140 hold there to be certain (perhaps "substan-
five") limits to such awards, based on principles of "reasonableness"
and/or the underlying goals of punitive damages law-punish-
ment, deterrence and (in a few states) compensation. 14 Yet none
of the justices, it would appear, finds that a "reasonable relation-
ship" rule between punitive and compensatory damages in and of
itself inheres in the Constitution. 142
Finally, and most unfortunately, it now appears quite clear 43
that due process does not require trial courts to explain their deci-
sions on post-trial motions to uphold punitive damage assessments,
even $10 million ones.14 4 However, without such an explicit appli-
cation of the law to the evidence by the judge who presided at the
trial, it is not clear how the Supreme Court expects appellate courts,
as required under Haslip, to determine if a particular defendant
subjected to a large punitive damages assessment was in fact highly
culpable and hence deserving of such a penalty.' 45 Presumably ap-
140. Id. at 2727 (contending that procedural due process requires judicial re-
view of punitive damages for reasonableness, but that there is no constitutional
right to a substantially correct determination of reasonableness).
141. Presumably, the "punishment" goal includes the goals of retribution, ed-
ucation (and possibly compensation); the "deterrence" goal includes the goal of
law enforcement; and the "compensation" goal includes both actual (but otherwise
noncompensable) damages and attorneys' fees (and other litigation expenses).
142. Hence, the Constitution quite clearly does not require a measurement
rule based on a multiple of compensatory damages. By the same token, however,
the Constitution would appear to provide no impediment to a multiple approach,
which surely represents a practical and fair-and, accordingly, perhaps the (sec-
ond) best-accommodation of the conflicting considerations. See Owen, Moral
Foundations, supra note 16, at 731-38 (discussing merits of multiple damages
approach).
143. To me, but not to Gerald Boston who informs me that he thinks that the
post-Haslip, pre-TXO requirement of some appellate courts, requiring trial courts
to provide a basis in the record for altering or refusing to alter a jury's award of
punitive damages, may survive TXO. See, e.g., Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244
(9th Cir. 1993) (remanding punitive damage award so that district court could
analyze its ruling in light of appellate court's opinion and provide reasons for ulti-
mate conclusion).
144. Largely as a result of Haslip, at least eight states recently have adopted a
requirement that trial courts explain their refusal to disturb jury awards of punitive
damages, as have several federal courts of appeals. See Transportation Ins. Co. v.
Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10 (1994) (refusing to impose this requirement on already
over-burdened Texas trial courts, but imposing it on state's intermediate appellate
courts).
145. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 449 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1991). The
Supreme Court in Haslip noted that courts must consider the following factors
when determining whether a punitive damage award is excessive:
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive dam-
ages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as
well as the harm that actually has occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensi-
bility of the defendant's conduct, the duration of that conduct, the de-
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pellate courts now will have to decide (or, more precisely, may con-
stitutionally decide) such cases solely from the transcript and
appellate argument without the benefit of the trial court's insights,
as the Supreme Court did in TXO.146
However, future defendants often will be less deserving than
the TXO defendant of penalties assessed against them. Yet appel-
late courts remote from the trial courtrooms will most probably be
reluctant to second guess the decisions of juries (and silent trial
courts) in such cases. Thus they probably will be inclined-indeed,
in a real sense will be forced-to give presumptive validity to such
awards. This was the unfortunate situation that prevailed before
Haslip, when there was little true judicial review of punitive damage
awards in mostjurisdictions-which appeared to be a major part of
the problem, that most of the Justices in Haslip properly sought to
rectify. In removing this important explanatory tooth from Haslip,
TXO may have the unfortunate effect of weakening more systemi-
cally the procedural structure established by Haslip that was begin-
ning to assure that punitive damage judgments were based on
proper considerations. After TXO, it looked as if both trial and ap-
pellate courts could comfortably regress to their pre-Haslip habit of
abdicating all but a semblance of judicial control over punitive
damages decisionmaking to the (properly instructed) jury.
In the fourth and final case to date, Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,147
the Court ruled that procedural due process requires that judicial
review be available for defendants to challenge punitive damage
awards on grounds of excessiveness. Oberg was a products liability
design defect case involving a three-wheeled all-terrain vehicle that
overturned, severely injuring the plaintiff, in which the jury
awarded the plaintiff $5 million in punitive damages in addition to
somewhat in excess of $900,000 in compensatory damages, the lat-
ter reduced by 20% on account of the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence. A unique state constitutional provision in Oregon
fendant's awareness, any concealment, and the existence and frequency
of similar past conduct; (c) the profitability to the defendant of the
wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and of hav-
ing the defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the "financial position" of the
defendant; (e) all the costs of litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal
sanctions on the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in mitiga-
tion; and (g) the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for
the same conduct,, these also to be taken in mitigation.
Id. at 21-22.
146. Except, of course, in those jurisdictions otherwise requiring trial courts
to specify reasons for their rulings on punitive assessments. See supra note 143.
147. 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
[Vol. 39: p. 363
A PUNITIVE DAMAGES OVERVIEW
effectively precluded judicial review of the amount of punitive dam-
age assessments. On this authority, and notwithstanding Haslip's
emphasis on the importance of'judicial review, the Oregon appel-
late courts in Oberg refused to review the defendant's claim that the
punitive damage award was excessive and affirmed the award. The
United States Supreme Court reversed:
The common law practice, the procedures applied in
every other State, the strong presumption favoring judicial
review that we have applied in other areas of law, and ele-
mentary considerations of justice, all support the conclu-
sion that such a decision should not be committed to the
unreviewable discretion of a jury. 148
On its face, Oberg is a trivial case. Why the Supreme Court
squandered its limited resources hearing the case and preparing a
full opinion on a clear and narrow punitive damages judicial review
issue-one that was plainly and strongly implicit in Haslip and ap-
plicable only to a single state-is difficult to understand. A brief
per curiam reversal on the basis of Haslip would seem to have been
the far more sensible course. Yet, Oberg does have some real value
for lawyers and lower courts, a value which lies in the tone of the
opinion rather than in its holding. In justifying the reversal of the
award, Justice Stevens for the majority149 underscored once again
the potential dangers of unchecked punitive damages verdicts and
the availability of the Due Process Clause to remedy arbitrary
awards. "Punitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary depri-
vation of property, since jury instructions typically leave the jury
with wide discretion in choosing amounts and since evidence of a
defendant's net worth creates the potential that juries will use their
verdicts to express biases against big businesses."'1 50 In sum, Oberg
realigns the Court's focus back to the Haslip Court's concerns
about: (1) the risk that punitive damages may be assessed against
defendants for the wrong reasons and otherwise unfairly, and (2)
the responsibility of the courts under the Due Process Clause to
remedy such arbitrary and improper awards. Significantly, the ef-
fect of the Court's resuscitation of Haslip in this manner is to color
TXO, sandwiched in between, as a perhaps unfortunate aberration
148. Id. at 2342.
149. Justice Scalia concurred and Justice Ginsburg dissented in an opinion in
which the Chief Justice joined.
150. Id. at 2340.
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in the developing Supreme Court jurisprudence on the constitu-
tional limits of punitive damages law.
.Additional due process (and other constitutional) questions re-
main unanswered that the Supreme Court may one day choose to
answer, and one may hope that the Court will continue to take Has-
lip, rather than TXO, as the model for its analysis. Surely the most
momentous question as yet unresolved by the Court is whether the
Constitution imposes any restraints on the repetitive imposition of
punitive damages in mass disaster litigation, such as the litigation
that has confronted the asbestos industry for many years.151 Other
than its workload, together with the inherent difficulty of the issue,
it is difficult to understand why the Court quite recently failed to
review this most important matter when presented with what ap-
peared to be the perfect opportunity.15 2 Many other fairness ques-
151. For a further discussion of these issues, see supra notes 106-16 and ac-
companying text.
152. See generally Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 58, 1385-86 (3d Cir.), modified in
part, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v.
Dunn, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993). In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, lower
courts continue to struggle with the problem as best they can. See Spaur v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854 (Iowa 1994). The Spaur court stated:
We have examined the authorities cited by OCF in support of its
position that multiple claims for punitive damages should not be allowed
in cases such as this. We do not disagree that the problem of successive
punitive damages awards in mass tort cases arising from the same conduct
is a serious one.... [M]any "powerful arguments have been made that, as
a matter of constitutional law or of substantive tort law, the courts shoul-
der some responsibility for preventing repeated awards of punitive dam-
ages for the same acts or series of acts." In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789
F.2d 996, 1005 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852, and cert. denied,
479 U.S. 915 (1986).
Nevertheless, the vast majority of state and federal courts "that have
addressed the issue have declined to strike punitive damages awards
merely because they constituted repetitive punishment for the same con-
duct." Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1385-86 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
- U.S. - (1993), 114 S. Ct. 650, 126 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1993) (collecting
state and federal cases)....
The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue of
whether the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution places a limit
on repetitive awards of punitive damages in mass tort litigation....
Thus, OCF seeks to have us take the lead and strike the punitive
damages award because the point of "overkill" has been reached. We
question whether such a remedy would be fair and effective. We believe
neither our action nor legislative action in Iowa will curb the problem of
multiple punitive damage awards in mass tort litigation.
Other courts have reached this same conclusion.
In concluding that multiple punitive damage awards are not incon-
sistent with the due process clause or substantive tort law principles,
both state and federal courts have recognized that no single court
can fashion an effective response to the national problem flowing
from mass exposure to asbestos products.
Dunn, I F.3d at 1386.
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tions discussed throughout this Article may (or may not) have due
process implications, such as the propriety of basing punitive assess-
ments upon the defendant's wealth, whether the burden of proof
for punitive damages may properly be set at only a preponderance
of the evidence,1 53 and many others. Only time will tell which of
the many fairness issues involved in the administration of the puni-
tive damages doctrine the Court will ultimately find to be of consti-
tutional dimension.
B. Legislative and Judicial Reform
Recently, the legislatures of more than half the states, and a
number of courts, have made a variety of changes in punitive dam-
ages law in an attempt to cure some of the doctrine's perceived
problems. Most of these changes have been procedural, and rela-
tively minor, yet several hold at least the potential for improving the
fairness of how punitive damages are assessed in certain cases. The
various reform proposals have been discussed by others elsewhere
at length, 54 and so they only need be lightly sketched out here.
1. Redefining the Standards: Both the definitions of the proscribed
misconduct and the standards for determining the amounts of
such awards may be improved.
This is an excellent reform that is needed in most states. The
basis of liability in most jurisdictions should be carefully redefined,
in part to reflect the flagrancy and extremity of the type of miscon-
duct deserving punishment. 55 The standards of both liability and
measurement should be directly and expressly related to the goals
of punitive damages.
2. Burden of Proof. The burden of proof may be raised from a "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" standard, ordinarily used in civil
law litigation, to proof that is "clear and convincing" or some-
thing similar.
This is an important and positive change that many legislatures
Spaur, 510 N.W.2d at 865-66; accord W.R. Grace & Co. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502
(Fla. 1994) (noting the problems of successive awards in mass tort litigation, but
refusing to limit their imposition).
153. Haslip suggests that such a higher standard of proof may not be constitu-
tionally required. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 449 U.S. 1, 23 n.11 (1991).
154. See, e.g., GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 4, § 21; Schwartz & Behrens,
supra note 128; Toy, supra note 104.
155. See Owen, Civil Punishment, supra note 16, at 114-17; Owen, Moral Founda-
tions, supra note 16, at 708-22; Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 4, at 1299-1371.
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and a few courts have made in recent years. 156 This reform should
serve to focus the decision-maker on the importance of careful de-
liberation on the merits of the case, and it should provide courts
with both the authority and obligation to review carefully the suffi-
ciency of the evidence for such awards.
3. Prima Facie Proof: The plaintiff may be required to prove a
prima facie case for punitive damages before such damages may
be pleaded, or before evidence may be introduced or argument
made with respect thereto.
If the plaintiff is precluded from claiming punitive damages in
his original complaint, one beneficial effect will be to prevent the
practice of some plaintiffs' lawyers of routinely asking for them in
every case. This latter result nicely resolves the knotty ethical proW
lem discussed above and should decrease the cost of litigation over-
all. 157 Another beneficial aspect of this reform is that it keeps
inflammatory rhetoric and evidence of the defendant's wealth out
of the case, and away from the jury, until the judge determines that
there is a legitimate punitive damages issue in the case.
4. Bifurcation: The bifurcation of trials may be permitted, or
required.
When juries hear a case involving punitive damages, the trial
may be bifurcated, to permit the defendant's underlying liability for
compensatory damages to be tried first, without contaminating the
jury's deliberation thereon with evidence and argument on puni-
tive damages. 158 In the abstract, this is a logical and fair reform and
156. GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 4, § 21.13. Several states, including Ala-
bama, Alaska, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, Ohio, Oregon and South Car-
olina have adopted statutes requiring a stricter standard of proof before a court
may enter a punitive damages award. Id. The statutes and cases are collected in
Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel. 879 S.W.2d 10 (1994) (refusing to adopt this
reform which had been considered and rejected by the Texas legislature).
157. Procedural changes along these lines are most important in cases tried
before juries, but such changes should decrease litigation costs in non-jury cases as
well. Although this type of change: will increase litigation costs in those few cases
where a prima facie claim is ultimately established (by a hearing and perhaps brief-
ing on this issue), such costs should be substantially outweighed by the decreased
costs from avoiding having to litigate a phantom issue in the great majority of cases
where quasi-criminal punishment simply has no place.
158. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d .502, 506 (Fla. 1994)
(holding that trial court on motion, should bifurcate punitive damages from re-
maining issues). See generally GHARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 4, § 12.01 (noting
danger that evidence regarding defendant's reckless or malicious conduct and fi-
nancial status may prejudice the jury's determination of liability for compensatory
damages); Seltzer, supra note 105, at 90 (maintaining that bifurcated trial would
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therefore should probably be adopted, although it may materially
increase the cost of litigation. This approach is procedurally awk-
ward, however, and it presents defendants with strategic problems
that may be greater than any countervailing advantages. 159 Because
the principal purpose of bifurcation is to provide fairness to the
defendant, it thus should not be a requirement but rather should
be an option, exclusively for the defendant to decide.
5. Caps and Multipliers: Some form of cap-a multiple of the
plaintiff's actual damages, a percentage of net worth, or an abso-
lute monetary amount-may be used to limit, determine, or guide
the amount of punitive damage awards.
Such arbitrary methods of measurement for punitive damage
awards reduce the risk of extreme, "runaway" awards, on the one
hand, and unduly low assessments on the other.160 However, such
approaches by their very nature simultaneously deprive the deci-
sion-maker of the flexibility of achieving optimal justice in particu-
lar cases by tailoring the punishment to fit the particular
wrongdoer and the particular crime. 61 As discussed above, a crea-
allow jury to receive all relevant evidence regarding amount of punitive damages
without prejudicing defendant on other disputed issues). Noting that at least 13
states require bifurcation, the Texas Supreme Court joined that group in Moriel.
159. This may help explain the exceedingly large verdict in Moseley v. General
Motors, which involved the explosion risk from side-mounted gas tanks on certain
G.M. pickup trucks. See General Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 447 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1994). In Phase I of the trial, the jury heard not only evidence with regard to
liability for compensatory damages, but also with regard to the propriety of an
award for punitive damages. Id. at 305. In Phase II, the jury determined the actual
amount of the punitive damage award. Id. Therefore, after finding the design of
the trucks defective in phase I of the trial, the jury then found General Motors
subject to $101 million in punitive damages in phase II. See id. The Georgia Court
of Appeals found this bifurcated proceeding to have improperly influenced the
jury. Id. However, because the case was remanded on other grounds, this opinion
is merely dicta. Id. at 306.
160. See generally Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Excessiveness or Inadequacy
of Punitive Damages Awarded in Personal Injury or Death Cases, 35 A.L.R.4TH 441
(1985); Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Punitive
Damages in Cases Not Involving Personal Injury or Death, 35 A.L.R.4TH 538 (1985).
161. Another arbitrary measurement method might be to define the amount
of such awards in terms of the amount by which the defendant did or expected to
profit by the wrong. In order for the deterrent effect to be correct, however, such
an amount would have to be multiplied by some factor reflecting the likelihood of
getting caught as perceived by the wrongdoer. For an interesting proposal along
these lines, see Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in "Punitive" Damages: Deterrence-
Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REv. 831 (1989). Indeed, the Supreme Court justi-
fied its decision upholding the punitive damage award in TXO on the basis of the
defendant's expected profits from its misconduct. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Co., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2722 (1993). One problem with this approach is
that it elevates deterrence to a preferred (and possibly exclusive) position among
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tive use of some combination of multiples, floors and caps, perhaps
with appropriate exceptions to permit at least some flexibility in
extreme cases, may be the best solution. Yet, flexibility leads to
abuse as well as justice, and the great advantage of predetermined
measurement approaches lies in their control of extremes and in
their administrative simplicity.
It may well be that the only practical (hence, second-best) solu-
tion is to legislate a combination of these arbitrary measurement
devices that appear best for the greatest number of ordinary cases
and to banish adjudicative discretion altogether from the measure-
ment decision. This would leave as the "only" question in punitive
damage cases the liability question of yea or nay, and the measure-
ment of such awards would be left to formulaic determination. I
think that such an approach would be well worth exploring, by both
legislators and commentators, but its development is beyond the
scope of the present Article.
6. Splitting Awards with the State: Some percentage of punitive
damage awards may be devoted to some public purpose.
Whether this reform is desirable depends to a large extent on
the absolute sizes of the compensatory and punitive awards, as dis-
cussed above. 162 While requiring that such-awards be split between
the plaintiff and the state may serve somewhat to reduce the plain-
tiff's incentive to pursue such claims, it otherwise makes sense in
cases involving very large punitive assessments.' 63 Awards of puni-
tive damages, being "quasi-criminal," are by their nature "quasi-pub-
lic;" therefore, the public logically should share in very large
awards. But the first and foremost office of punitive damages
should be to achieve justice between the parties in the "private" law-
suit, such that the victim ought to be truly fully compensated-both
in terms of actual losses and retribution - before the public
should have a claim at all.' 64 Thus, in cases where the amount of
the various functions of such awards, and it does not seem practicably convertible
to a pluralistic approach promoting in some manner each of the goals examined
earlier that properly support and define the punitive damages doctrine.
162. See supra note 103.
163. See State v. Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993) (holding Georgia statute,
which requires 75% of punitive damages awards be apportioned to state, is consti-
tutional); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993) (same). Contra
Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991) (holding such a statute
unconstitutional).
164. If a jurisdiction chooses to allocate some portion of punitive damage
awards to the state, the public-law nature of such awards is strengthened. In this
event, such awards may become subject to constitutional inquiry under the Exces-
sive Fines Clause. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
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such damages is relatively modest, the plaintiff should have a prior,
exclusive claim to the total award.
7. Single Award: Punitive damages may be limited to a single as-,
sessment against an actor for a single act of misconduct resulting
in a multiplicity of harms.
Although this reform 165 may superficially appear both logical
and fair, it would work poorly in mass tort cases in which claims
mount over time, as discussed above. 166 Assuming that a proper
aggregate amount for the single punitive damages award could ra-
tionally be determined, which ordinarily would be highly unlikely,
the "single Shot" approach denies the importance of the functions
of compensation and restitutionary retribution. The single award
approach should therefore be rejected in mass tort ongoing-claim
situations, on grounds of both principle and practicality. 167 Yet, the
single shot approach appears desirable in single-event disasters,
such as airplane or train crashes and hotel fires, where a defend-
ant's aggregate liability is reasonably determinable within a finite
period of time, especially if it is determinable in a single proceed-
ing. In such a context, the adjudication of a single judgment for
punitive damages would be administratively feasible and efficient,
and the court could practicably assure that each victim received a
fair share of the aggregate award.
8. Judge v. Jury: Responsibility for determining the amount of such
awards may be transferred to the judge.
This procedural change is designed to reduce the risk of bi-
ased juries rendering run-away punitive damage awards. In some
ways this reform appears to make good sense, 168 for such determi-
165. This approach was adopted by the Georgia legislature. See GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e) (1) (1987) (providing that only one punitive damage award
may be recovered from defendant in products liability action, regardless of
number of suits brought). This provision was held unconstitutional in McBride v.
General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1579-80 (M.D. Ga. 1990). The court
determined that limiting punitive damages to one award is both arbitrary and un-
reasonable. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1576. It was subsequently upheld, however,
by the Georgia Supreme Court in Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga.
1993).
166. See supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
167. The 'multiplier approach, perhaps determined once and for all in an
aggregate claims proceeding, appears to be a preferrable approach in such ongo-
ing mass tort situations. See supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
168. See Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 4, at 1320-22 (advocating shifting
measurement function from jury tojudge). This approach also appears to be con-
stitutional. See Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985 (Kan. 1993) (no violation of rights
to equal protection, trial by jury or due process).
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nations are in the nature of quasi-criminal sentencing. Judges are
generally more qualified than jurors-in training, temperament
and experience-to fix the amounts of such sanctions. Yet, even
judges may be biased and ideologically committed, one way or the
other, and the institution of the jury at least requires a compromise
among extremes. Once again, the most practical, second-best solu-
tion to the measurement problem may lie in formulating a combi-
nation of arbitrary measurement devices, as considered above.
9. Compliance with Law: The defendant's compliance with perti-
nent regulatory or other legal provisions may serve as an absolute
defense or it may give rise to a presumption against such
damages.
The basic concept of a compliance with law defense appears to
make good sense, for ordinarily an actor is far from acting quasi-
criminally in doing what the government permitted or required. 169
However, because legislatures and regulatory bodies often have
much less information than manufacturers and other enterprises
on specific problems, and because such public institutions move
much more slowly and with far less flexibility, the presumptive ap-
proach is certainly preferable to an absolute defense.170
10. Written Explanations: Trial and appellate courts mdy be re-
quired to justify their decisions on punitive damage awards.
As discussed in the constitutional reform context above,17'
many punitive damages problems may be minimized if both trial
and appellate courts are required to provide detailed justifica-
tions-in the record or by opinion-for affirming, upsetting or re-
mitting punitive damage assessments. Such justifications, tying the
evidence to the facts, the law and the purposes of punitive damages,
should assure that the courts work through the smoke of rhetoric
and emotion at the trial to determine if such damages truly are de-
served on the evidence, and, if they are, if the amounts of such
awards are truly warranted. A number of states have adopted this
salutary reform in recent years, and it would seem to be a necessary
procedural bedrock for substantive fairness in the administration of
the law of punitive damages.
169. See generally Owen, Problems, supra note 8, at 41-42; Teresa Moran
Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1335 (1993)
[hereinafter Moran Schwartz]; Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 128, at 1383-84.
170. See generally Moran Schwartz, supra note 169 (arguing against compliance
defense).
171. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
Punitive damages have an ancient history, and they provide a
flexible tool to straddle the tort and criminal law, helping achieve
the goals of both. Such assessments generate a large variety of
problems, both substantive and procedural, some imagined, others
trivial, but some involving serious questions of fairness in how the
doctrine is applied. Yet, most of the more serious problems with
such damages have workable solutions, and the remaining
problems appear on balance to be outweighed, quite heavily, by the
benefits that the proper use of this civil-law doctrine achieves far
more satisfactorily in a free nation than would the law of crimes.
The punitive damages doctrine must be defined carefully, and safe-
guards must be provided to prevent its untoward abuse. Yet, in
cases involving flagrant violations of the law, the doctrine holds
great potential for enhancing private freedoms, promoting equal-
ity, improving the administration ofjustice between private litigants
and advancing overall the welfare of the public.
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